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TERRORISM AND THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS
John T. Parry*
Can we afford the luxury of pretending that the threats today are
simply law enforcement problems .... rather than threats of a
fundamentally different nature, requiring fundamentally differ-
ent approaches?'
The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the appli-
cation of all elements of our national power and influence. Not
only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Home-
land and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and de-
prive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We
have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counter-
terrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain.2
A war to create and maintain social order can have no end. It
must involve the continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and
violence. In other words, one cannot win such a war, or, rather,
it has to be won again every day. War has thus become virtually
indistinguishable from police activity.'
* Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. This Article began as a paper for the
Working Group on Liberty and Security in an Age of Proliferation and Terror, at the Ridgway
Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public
and International Affairs. I am grateful for comments from members of that group, particu-
larly Bill Keller and Lisa Nelson. My arguments have also greatly benefitted from the Law
of Torture discussion list organized by Marty Lederman and Kim Scheppele, and from ex-
changes with Elena Baylis, Robert Chesney, Oren Gross, Andrea Hibbard, John Kroger,
Sanford Levinson, Erik Luna, Geoff Marine, Ruth Miller, and Steve Vladeck.
1 Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Address at the 88th Annual American Legion
National Convention (Aug. 29, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?
SpeechID=1033.
2 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 1 (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2O03/02/counterterrorism/counter
_terrorismstrategy.pdf.
3 MICHAELHARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE
OF EMPIRE 14 (2004) [hereinafter HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE].
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the "war on terror" has accelerated the development of
a new criminal process and that this new process has increasingly displaced tradi-
tional methods of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing people who have engaged
in conduct that is subject to criminal penalties-whether or not that conduct is consid-
ered "terrorism." I also contend that this new process is largely consistent with consti-
tutional norms that are changing under the same pressures that drive the development
4 For a recent definition of "terrorism," see Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub.
L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2629-30 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 950v(b)(24) (2006)). On the problem of defining "terrorism," see HELEN DuFFY, THE "WAR
ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-46 (2005). The definitional
problem reflects the more serious theoretical problem that terrorism tends to be conceived
of as violence against hegemonic modem states or their allies that themselves employ vio-
lence and other forms of power on a global scale. I seek to sidestep these issues here by taking
seriously and assessing on their terms the claims that U.S. officials are making about terrorism.
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of the new criminal process. Those pressures, in turn, derive not just from specific
events but also from the perception of emergency and rapid change that character-
izes modem society and political life.
In terms of definition, the new criminal process remains a moving target for at
least three reasons: first, it is still a work in progress; second, it extends beyond the
boundaries of what we normally think of as criminal process or the criminal justice
system; and third-perhaps paradoxically-it overlaps so much with what we have
already come to accept as normal or traditional criminal processes. Throughout this
Article, I will treat the indefinite detention and trial by military commission of sus-
pected terrorists as emblematic (but not exhaustive) of the new criminal process. Not
only have these efforts been central to the Bush administration's anti-terror efforts,
but they have also resulted in Supreme Court opinions-most recently the decision
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 5-that bear on and to some degree constrain the development
of the new criminal process. Despite their importance, however, these cases risk divert-
ing attention from the ways in which the new criminal process has already expanded
executive power, licensed state violence, and transformed the citizen-state relationship.
The third epigraph to this Article comments on these developments. It suggests
not only that war has changed in its functions, to become more like policing, but also
that policing too has changed, to become more like war. To accompany this blur-
ring of functions, legal structures for controlling violent state actions seem less likely
to make distinctions between the two---or at least they have made it easier for state
actors to move from crime to war and back again in their efforts to maintain social
order. As these activities have converged, the question of what is a police action and
what is a military action has become more difficult to answer.
My use of this epigraph has an additional purpose. My analysis throughout this
Article is indebted to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri' s influential books, Empire
and Multitude.6 I also draw on the pathbreaking work of Giorgio Agamben, whose
Homo Sacer and State of Exception pose important challenges for liberal theory.7 De-
spite the importance of the work of these authors, few U.S. legal scholars have made
serious efforts to engage with them. One reason may be that they must be handled
with care. Empire and Multitude are full of sweeping assertions, alternately brilliant
and infuriating.8 Agamben's analysis is often dense, and his call for "deactivat[ing]"
1 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
6 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000) [hereinafter HARDT & NEGRI,
EMPIRE]; HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 3.
1 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-
Roazen trans., 1998) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER]; GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF
EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION].
8 Accord David Singh Grewal, Empire's Law, 14 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 211,213 (2002)
(book review) (describing the argument of Empire as "complex and nuanced, but sometimes
difficult to follow and maddeningly impenetrable"). For a useful collection of critical essays,
see EMPIRE'S NEW CLOTHES: READING HARDT AND NEGRI (Paul A. Passavant & Jodi Dean
eds., 2004) [hereinafter EMPIRE's NEW CLOTHES].
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law so that "[o]ne day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused
objects," 9 does not gibe with his diagnosis of modernity,"° let alone with legal sensi-
bilities. Nonetheless, these theorists say much that is useful about the nature and
functions of law in modern states, and one of the goals of this Article is to integrate
their work with more familiar forms of legal analysis."
The convergence of police and military activities that Hardt and Negri describe
maps to the choice between traditional and new criminal processes, and the acceler-
ation of this convergence results from the perception of emergency created by the 9/11
attacks.' 2 Consider the assertion that "everything changed" after 9/11. When legal
or political figures make this claim, their goal is more than rhetorical. They seek to
convince us that we live in an exceptional moment, and they call us to a state of ex-
ception as a matter of law and politics. That is the basic point of the first two epigraphs
from the then-Secretary of Defense and the White House. The aspects of the new
criminal process that relate to the war on terror provide a legal structure for imple-
menting the idea that everything has changed. They codify a state of emergency, but
the perception of emergency should not be equated with panic. Many of these new pro-
cesses were carefully planned. And, although executive power has expanded, Congress
has shown increasing willingness to second guess executive power claims and sub-
stitute its own judgment. The new criminal process is thus a deliberate, sturdy, and
evolving construct for what are arguably exceptional times.
Many observers, of course, reject the foundational claims of the new criminal pro-
cess as a response to terrorism. They deny the assertion that we are at war, and they
9 AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 7, at 64, 88.
0 This point is also made by many of the essays in POLrICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH:
ESSAYS ON GIORGIO AGAMBEN'S HoMo SACER (Andrew Norris ed., 2005) [hereinafter
POLrICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH], and by Nasser Hussain and Melissa Ptacek in their
review, Thresholds: Sovereignty and the Sacred, 34 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 495 (2000).
"' Although Hardt and Negri draw on Agamben, their analyses do not thoroughly comple-
ment each other. Agamben focuses his attention on the sovereign power of the state, whereas
Hardt and Negri suggest a world in which state-centered notions of sovereignty have begun
to fragment and in which power circulates through global networks. My use of Hardt and
Negri in an article about the ways in which U.S. criminal procedure reflects modem state
power thus presents an incomplete picture of their project. Further, my emphasis on modem
state power distorts Agamben's analysis to some extent, because his project stresses "a reve-
lation or a coming to light of what was present in the West's conception of politics from the
start." Hussain & Ptacek, supra note 10, at 498.
12 See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT
WAR 20-22 (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029,
1032-37 (2004); see also THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND
COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME]; Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Essay, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Uni-
lateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in id. at 161
(suggesting the development of new criminal processes is a common and not surprising
response to insurgency and terrorism).
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contend that the traditional criminal process can handle terrorism. Terrorism may
have moved to the center of the national agenda and significant changes may have
been made in our strategies for fighting it, but one might agree with Bruce Ackerman
that while terrorist campaigns are destabilizing and deadly, they do not threaten the
existence of the United States or the functioning of our constitutional system. 13 Much
remains the same, and daily life for the majority of Americans goes on as before. If
this response is correct, then the acceleration of the new criminal process is at best
an overreaction based on a misperception.
I make no effort in this Article to resolve the debate over what has changed since
9/11. Nor, for that matter, do I seek to define or assert a proper balance between liberty
and security in response to terror. My goal is to analyze the new criminal process on
its own terms and in relation to traditional processes and also to suggest that "tradi-
tional" processes already reflect the new process. My focus will be descriptive, inter-
pretive, and to some extent predictive; I advance no calls for "reform." To that end,
my schematic account of the debate over post-9/1 1 change seeks primarily to isolate
diverging lines of thought that support, respectively, the traditional and new criminal
processes. Both are defensible; neither can be entirely proven or falsified absent some
kind of value judgment or normative baseline that no law professor has any special
ability to provide.
Having made these assertions, I will admit that I think the federal government has
shifted too far in favor of military and other solutions to terrorism at the expense of
traditional responses. Terrorism may be more than aggravated crime, but traditional
processes should remain the presumption because they are more familiar, fairer, better
supported by developed legal doctrine, and more in accord with separation of powers
values. I also see traditional criminal processes---even to the extent they already reflect
the new criminal process-as part of a more restrained model for responding to the
risk of terrorism we are likely to experience for the foreseeable future. Still, my views
rest upon a chain of reasoning and a baseline that the new criminal process contests,
and that deeper contest and its implications-rather than simple normative claims-are
the focus of this Article.
Part I of this Article describes executive and congressional actions in the war on
terror to illustrate the ways in which anti-terror efforts have changed since 9/11. The
last section of Part I considers the Supreme Court's response to some of these actions-
a response that seeks with varying success to accommodate emergency claims with
rule of law and due process values. Part II makes a short detour by presenting a more
policy-oriented assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the new criminal process
'" See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1040. From the international law perspective, the war-
crime distinction is significant but not determinative for the scope of human rights pro-
tections. As Helen Duffy points out, "recourse to the legal standards applicable in 'war' has
been selective post 9/11, invoked to justify what would be impermissible under [international
human rights law], yet without acknowledging that corresponding rights under [international
humanitarian law] take effect." DuFFY, supra note 4, at 340.
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as compared to traditional processes. It also suggests that the ability to choose be-
tween the two is becoming increasingly difficult. Part III explains why this is through
an examination of "everyday" constitutional criminal-procedure doctrine, which reveals
that doctrinal change has already brought us well down the road of the new criminal
process. Part IV concludes by discussing the relationship between the new criminal
process and the idea of emergency power and suggesting that the new criminal process
is simply part of a larger shift in state power and the practice of governing.
I. STRUCTURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY
A. The Executive Branch
Two months after the 9/11 attacks, on November 13, 2001, President Bush issued
an executive order that authorized the detention and military trial of non-citizens "at
an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the
United States" if "there is reason to believe that such individual" (1) was a member
of al Qaeda, (2) had "engaged in [or] aided... acts of international terrorism" intended
to cause "injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national secu-
rity, foreign policy, or economy," or (3) had harbored someone described in the first
two categories. 4
Under the authority of the November 13 order, the government began to use the
Guantanamo Bay naval base, as well as other locations inside and outside the U.S., to
confine people detained during law enforcement, military, and intelligence operations
in the United States, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places. 5 At least in the first year
or so after 9/11, one's ultimate destination did not depend on whether military or law
enforcement officials made the initial stop. Individuals picked up during law enforce-
ment operations might find themselves in military custody, as was the case with Ali
Saleh al-Marri 16 and, initially, Jose Padilla, 7 while individuals captured by the military
might find themselves facing civilian criminal process, as was the case with John
Walker Lindh.' Still others were placed in the custody of the CIA. 9
4 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
3 C.F.R. § 918 (2002).
15 See John Sifton, United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Personnel
Abroad: Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 488-89 (2006).
16 See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005).
17 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Padilla was subsequently indicted and
transferred to civilian custody. See United States v. Hassoun, No.04-60001-CR-COOKE
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2005) (superseding indictment), available at http://www.flsd.uscourts
.gov/default.asp?File=cases/index.html#; see also Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006).
"s See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). For discussion of all
three cases, see Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military
Detention, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1255.
"9 See OFFICE OF THE DiR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE HIGH VALUE
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Lawyers at the White House, the Justice Department, the State Department, and
the Defense Department drafted and debated a series of legal memoranda on the appli-
cation to these "detainees" 2 of the Geneva Conventions, other sources of international
law, and domestic constitutional and statutory law. Ultimately, the President con-
cluded that the Geneva Conventions apply to the Taliban, but that members of the
Taliban are unlawful combatants who "do not qualify as prisoners of war," and that
the Conventions do not apply to members of al Qaeda.2 ' He also directed that all
persons detained by U.S. armed forces be treated "humanely and, to the extent appro-
priate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the prin-
ciples of Geneva."22
The administration resisted efforts to review its decisions to hold people in mili-
tary detention. In response, however, to the Supreme Court's Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 23
and Rasul v. Bush 24 decisions the Department of Defense created Combatant Status
Review Tribunals for people held at Guantanamo. 2' The tribunals found that a hand-
ful of prisoners-38 out of 558-should no longer be classified as enemy combatants,
although not all of them have been released.26 The Defense Department also created
an Administrative Review Board that provides an annual review to determine whether
each detainee "should be released, transferred or continue to be detained. '27 As of
February 9, 2006, this process resulted in decisions to release 14 people, transfer
120, and continue to detain 329.28
TERRORIST DETAINEE PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.rnillpdf/
thehighvaluedetaineeprogram2.pdf; George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Discusses
Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html [hereinafter President Discusses
Military Commissions].
20 On the significance of using the term "detainee," with its suggestion of suspended or
absent rights, rather than the word "prisoner," to describe the people held in places like
Guantanamo Bay, see JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS OF MOURNING AND
VIOLENCE 64 (2004).
2 Memorandum from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to the Vice President et. al. (Feb.
7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
22 Id.
23 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
24 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
25 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy
(July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.nillnews/Jul2OO4/d2OO4O7O7review.pdf.
26 Department of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary, http://www
.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf [hereinafter CSRT Summary].
27 Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of State et al.
(Sept. 14, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d2OO409l4adminreview.pdf.
28 News Release, Dep't of Def., Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative Review Board
Decisions Completed (Feb. 9,2006), http://www.defenselink.nilreleases/2006/nr20060209-
12464.htrrl.
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The administration also resisted efforts to obtain review of CSRT decisions, and
district courts split on their ability to hear claims about the CSRTs.2 9 Congress ulti-
mately stepped in to allow a limited form of review. The Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA) bars habeas review of CSRT decisions for prisoners at Guantanamo and sub-
stitutes review by the D.C. Circuit on two issues only: whether the decision of the
CSRT was consistent with standards and procedures developed by the Secretary of
Defense, and whether those standards and procedures are themselves consistent with
federal law.3" Under the Military Commissions Act (MCA), the DTA's denial of
habeas and provision of limited D.C. Circuit review now applies to any alien detained
by the United States as an enemy combatant.3
With respect to the interrogation of people detained in military and CIA custody,
administration officials concluded that international and domestic law places few con-
straints on the aggressive interrogation of suspected terrorists. Federal statutes and
international law prohibit torture,32 and international law also prohibits cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment.33 In addition, the Constitution puts limits on
the government's ability to use violence, as with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the due process clauses to prevent state action that "shocks the conscience."34 But
in August 2002, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) concluded
that these prohibitions permit interrogation that is not specifically intended to cause
severe pain and that "severe pain" for purposes of the ban on torture means only pain
29 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding
CSRTs fail to provide due process); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (find-
ing no substantive legal basis to review complaint about detention). The D.C. Circuit recently
upheld the application of the Military Commissions Act to all of these detainees. See
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2007).
30 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat.
2680, 2742 (2006).
"' MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 7(a), 10, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006); see
Boumediene, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682.
32 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [herein-
after Convention Against Torture]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
7, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2,999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Federal
statutes criminalize a variety of conduct that may rise to the level of torture. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 113 (assault), 114 (maiming with intent to torture), 241 (conspiracy against civil rights), 242
(deprivation of civil rights), 956 (conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage
property in a foreign country), 1111 (murder), 1112 (manslaughter), 1117 (conspiracy to
murder), 1201 (kidnapping), 1203 (hostage taking), 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse), 2242 (sex-
ual abuse), 2244 (abusive sexual contact), 2245 (sexual abuse resulting in death), 2340A
(torture committed overseas), 2441 (war crimes).
" ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 7. Whether article 16 of the Convention Against Torture
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is less clear. See John T. Parry, "Just for
Fun ": Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y
253, 266 (2005).
31 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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of a level "that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical con-
dition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment of bodily func-
tions."35 Both the merits of this opinion and the professionalism of the attorneys who
drafted it have been strongly challenged.36 On December 30,2004, OLC issued a new
memorandum that repudiated the definition in the earlier memorandum and instead con-
cludes that interrogators cannot engage in conduct that is "extreme and outrageous.""
For its part, the Defense Department convened a "working group on detainee in-
terrogations." The working group reviewed the law of interrogation and proposed a
list of thirty-five acceptable interrogation techniques that could be used on people held
"outside" the U.S. 38 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ultimately authorized
twenty-four of those techniques (generally the least severe) for use at Guantanamo
Bay, with the proviso that four of them could only be used in cases of "military neces-
sity" but that he might approve additional techniques on written request in individual
cases.39 The techniques used at Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq and
mingled with aggressive methods adopted by troops on the ground as commanders
shared information and interrogators moved from one location to another.4° More
generally, the sense that the government was "taking the gloves off' with respect to
the treatment of suspected terrorists sent a strong signal that tough tactics were
appropriate-in the words of one interrogator, that "[i]f you don't violate someone's
human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job.'
31 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R.
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 21,
at 172, 176; accord Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Atty. Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 218.
36 See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J.
NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 455 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 641 (2005); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425 (2005).
31 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to James B.
Comey, Deputy Atty. Gen. (Dec. 30,2004), in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 361, 368
(Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum to James B. Comey].
38 WORKING GROUP, DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (2003),
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 21, at 286, 341-43.
31 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., to the Commander, U.S. S.
Command (Apr. 16, 2003), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 21, at 360.
40 THE SCHLESINGER REPORT: FINAL REPORT TO THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEw
DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), in THETORTURE PAPERS, supra note 21, at 908,923-26.
"' Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH.
POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al; Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and
After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence and the Permanent H. Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 601 (2002) (statement
of Cofer Black, Former Chief, DCTS Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency)
("After 9/11 the gloves come off."), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov.
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Responding to the President's order on trying non-citizens suspected of terrorism,
the Defense Department also issued a series of "Military Commission Instructions"
that define both the procedures to be used by military tribunals and the crimes triable
before them. 2 In the Detainee Treatment Act, Congress barred habeas review for
military commissions and gave the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review mili-
tary commission decisions for consistency with military commission orders, and to
review whether the standards and procedures in the military commission orders are
consistent with the Constitution and federal law.43 Review was to be discretionary
except for persons sentenced to death or to more than ten years imprisonment."
Several persons were designated for trial before the commissions, and counsel were
assigned to some of them, but no trials have taken place. At first, trials were delayed
as debate continued within the administration over the rights of detainees and whether
the military commission rules were appropriate.4" With the Supreme Court's decision
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the commissions were unable to operate until Congress en-
acted the Military Commissions Act, which codified much of the military commission
instructions but also nudged the process closer to the standards of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.4 The Military Commissions Act also confirmed the limited fed-
eral court review previously established by the Detainee Treatment Act.47 In February
2007, President Bush signed an executive order establishing military commissions pur-
suant to the statute, and the Department of Defense released Notifications of Sworn
Charges against three people held at Guantanamo.8
In addition, the administration expanded the use of existing laws and practices
with the goal of preventing future attacks. Perhaps most important is the Justice
Department's creative and expansive interpretations of conspiracy law and of the
material support of terrorism statutes.49 Prosecutors have also used the federal
42 32 C.F.R. pts. 9-14 (2006).
4' DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(3), 119 Stat. 2680, 2740-41 (2006).
4 See id.
4' Tim Golden, Administration Officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals, N.Y. TMES,
Oct. 25, 2004, at Al; Tim Golden, U.S. Is Examining Plan to Bolster Detainee Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at Al.
46 See MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 3, 4,9, 120 Stat. 2600,2600-31, 2636-37 (2006).
47 Id. §§ 3, 9. Section 9 of the Act also provides that D.C. Circuit review is as of right,
not discretionary as it had been in the DTA. Id. § 9.
48 See Press Release, The White House, Executive Order Trial of Alien Unlawful Enemy
Combatants by Military Commission (Feb. 14,2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2007/02/print/20070214-5.html. The Notifications of Sworn Charges are
available at the Department of Defense Web page on press materials about military commis-
sions. See http://www.defenselink .mil/news/commissionspress.html.
" See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands
of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Chesney, Sleeper Scenario]; Robert
M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated
Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=932608
[hereinafter Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?].
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material-witness statute to arrest and imprison suspicious individuals who may have
information relevant to grand jury investigations into terrorist activity.5° In many
cases, prosecutors have enforced relatively minor provisions of the immigration laws
more strictly in order to detain, interrogate, and ultimately remove illegal immigrants
deemed suspicious-usually Muslims or people of Arab ethnicity.5'
The government has also employed its investigative capabilities to their fullest.
In 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft changed FBI guidelines to allow agents
to attend religious and political events that are "open to the public," for the purpose
of gathering information on the activities of these groups.52 In addition, not only
have intelligence officials made full use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) process,53 but the National Security Agency intercepted some international calls
involving people in the U.S. without obtaining FISA warrants.54 This practice may
be unconstitutional after Hamdan,55 and the administration recently announced that
it had discontinued the program after obtaining warrants to intercept such calls from
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.56 The administration has also engaged in
extensive data mining of communications and financial information and expanded
the use of "national security letters. 57 These broad efforts to obtain information do-
mestically and internationally about citizens and aliens alike justify Jack Balkin and
SO See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared": Reexamining
Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV.
677 (2005); Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism, 35
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1217 (2002).
"' See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLAL. REv. 1575, 1576-80
(2002) (describing some of these initiatives).
52 See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at
Al; see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Documents Shed New Light on
Pentagon Surveillance of Peace Activists (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/spyfiles/27050prs20061012.html (discussing cooperation between DOJ and DOD).
The old policy was itself a response to perceived excesses of the F.B.I. under J. Edgar
Hoover and during the Nixon administration. See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVTIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No.
94-755 (1976); Lichtblau, supra.
3 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1863 (2006).
s For a good discussion of the issues raised by the decision to bypass FISA, see John Cary
Sims, What NSA Is Doing ... and Why It's Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105 (2006).
" See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (holding the program unconstitutional).
56 See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Atty. Gen., to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen
Specter (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/agO1l707.pdf. The
House of Representatives had passed legislation to authorize certain forms of warrantless
surveillance, see House Passes Bill to Allow Surveillance Without Warrant in Face of
Imminent Threat, 75 U.S.L.W. 2182 (2006), available at http://pubs.bna.com, but the Senate
did not take up the legislation.
" See Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Expands Intelligence Role In U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at Al.
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Sanford Levinson's claim that the U.S. is turning into a "National Surveillance State"
and their argument that these technologies will inevitably be used for domestic crime
control purposes.5
The administration also expanded the practice of "rendition"-the informal trans-
fer of a person from one country to another for purposes of trial or interrogation. Fed-
eral immigration and international extradition statutes govern executive efforts to move
aliens and citizens from the United States to another country, and the President has
no plenary authority to extradite a person who is lawfully in the United States. 59 But
those statutes do not apply to the efforts of U.S. officials overseas to transfer or en-
courage the transfer of a person from one foreign country to another foreign country.60
Operating under a policy initiated by the Clinton administration, the Bush adminis-
tration increased the practice of "extraordinary rendition," in which suspected terrorists
were sent to countries whose interrogators would use torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading interrogation techniques that U.S. officials were unwilling to use directly
or at least were unwilling to use on these particular suspects.6'
Some "high value" suspects, by contrast, have been detained and interrogated by
CIA operatives outside the United States, independent from the military or domestic
law enforcement.62 News reports suggest that a variety of coercive practices have been
used on these "ghost detainees. '63 Without detailing those practices, President Bush
confined on September 6, 2006 that "the CIA used an alternative set of procedures"
58 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 101 (2006).
51 See John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J.
INT'LL. 93, 121-24 (2002) [hereinafter Parry, Lost History]. Doctrinally, an alien who is on
U.S. soil for the purpose of seeking entry into the United States has not entered the country.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
6 For discussion of rendition prior to 9/11, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of
United States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U.
J. INT'LL. &POL. 813 (1993).
61 See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL
JUSTICE, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRA-
ORDINARY RENDITIONS" 22-23 (2004), available at http://www.umaryland.edu/healthsecurity/
docsITORTUREBYPROXY.pdf; Margaret L. Satterwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extra-
ordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (N.Y.U.
Law Sch., Pub. Law Res. Paper No. 06-36), available at http:ll ssm.com/abstract=94571 1;
David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention,
46 VA. J. INT'LL. (forthcoming 2006) (Minn. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 06-39), available
at http://ssm.comabstract=925880.
62 See President Discusses Military Commissions, supra note 19 and accompanying text;
see also Michael Hirsh et al., AboardAir CIA, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 32; Josh White,
Army Documents ShedLight on CIA 'Ghosting,' WASH. POST, March 24, 2005, at A15; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES' "DISAPPEARED": THE CIA's LONG-TERM "GHOST
DETAINEES" (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/us 1004.pdf.
63 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 62.
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in its interrogations.64 According to the President, "the procedures were tough, and
they were safe, and lawful, and necessary."'65 The CIA is not specifically included
in President Bush's February 2002 "humane treatment" directive, and OLC's August
2002 memorandum is widely viewed as intended to give the CIA considerable
room to choose among potential interrogation tactics and practices to be inflicted on
the "ghosts." 66 A footnote in the December 30, 2004 OLC opinion indicates that
OLC has prepared other memoranda on interrogation that have not been made public
and that the conclusions in those memoranda remain valid,67 and President Bush's
September 6 speech affirms that "[tihe Department of Justice reviewed the autho-
rized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful. 68 Put plainly, the
CIA has been operating a parallel system for detention and coercive interrogation,
and both the existence of this system and the use of these techniques have been
validated by classified legal memoranda and policy decisions.
After Hamdan, CIA officials apparently "refused to carry out further interroga-
tions and run the secret facilities ... until the legal situation was clarified." 69 In his
September 6 speech, President Bush announced the transfer of fourteen men from
CIA custody to Guantanamo Bay so that they could be tried by military commissions.7'
He also declared that "[t]he current transfers mean that there are now no terrorists
in the CIA program."' Further, he admitted that Hamdan's conclusion that Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the conflict with al Qaeda "has put
in question the future of the CIA program" because it raised the possibility that CIA
officials could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act for violations of Common
Article 3.72 But the President also insisted that, "as more high-ranking terrorists are
6 President Discusses Military Commissions, supra note 19.
65 Id.
66 See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, Understanding the OLC Torture Memos,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005_01_02_balkin_archive.html (Jan. 7, 2005, 09:15 CST).
67 Memorandum to James B. Comey, supra note 37, at 362 n.8 ("[W]e have reviewed this
Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not believe
that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this
memorandum.").
68 President Discusses Military Commissions, supra note 19.
69 Guy Dinmore, CIA Agents 'Refused to Operate' at Secret Jails, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2006, http://search.ft.com/ (search according to title keywords).
70 President Discusses Military Commissions, supra note 19.
71 Id.
72 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), amended by MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat.
2600, 2631-35 (2006). Common Article 3 appears in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and creates minimum standards for the protection of people caught up in armed conflicts.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949,
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captured, the need to obtain intelligence from them will remain critical-and having
a CIA program for questioning terrorists will continue to be crucial to getting life-
saving information. '73 The subsequent enactment of the Military Commissions Act
effectively allows the CIA to restart the ghost detainee program by redefining the
conduct that is subject to prosecution under the War Crimes Act.74
Finally, the executive branch has also asserted the power to inflict summary exe-
cution on suspected terrorists, as with the killing of alleged al Qaeda member Qaed
Salim Sinan al-Harethi on November 3, 2002 in Yemen.75 To the extent the "war on
terror" really is a war, this killing can be described as a targeted military operation.76
Yet at the same time, the deliberate choice to kill al-Harethi rather than capture him
for purposes of prosecution provides a powerful example of the choices available
under the new criminal process.
B. Congress
Although it has conducted little oversight of the administration's actions, Congress
has not been idle. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed an Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) that empowered the president
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, orga-
nizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 31.
" President Discusses Military Commissions, supra 19. By contrast, the Department of
Defense quickly responded to Hamdan by declaring that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions would apply to "all DoD personnel." Memorandum from Gordon England,
Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Secretaries of the Military Departments et al. (July 7, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/genevaconvdoc.pdf.
14 MCA, § 6, 120 Stat. at 2631-35; Press Release, The White House, The Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/10/20061017.html.
71 See James Risen, Threats and Responses: C.LA. Is Reported to Kill a Leader ofQaeda
in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at Al.
76 For a good discussion of the incident, its international law implications, and its bearing
on the war/crime debate, see David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists:
Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'LL. 171 (2005).
For the Israeli Supreme Court's recent discussion of the circumstances under which targeted
killings are consistent with international law, see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. Israel [2005], available at http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/
a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
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acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons."
The administration has cited this resolution as authority to undertake a wide variety
of anti-terror and military activities against citizens and aliens.
On October 26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act became law."8 The Act expands
the powers of law enforcement officials to investigate criminal activity, whether or
not that activity is defined as "terroriSt. '79 Among other things, the provisions of the
Act
loosen the restrictions on the government's use of electronic sur-
veillance, loosen the secrecy that attaches to grand jury delib-
erations, add to its authority to address money laundering, give it
additional procedural power in certain kinds of immigration
matters, and facilitate cooperation between government agents
focused on intelligence gathering and those whose goal is arrest
and prosecution. 80
Several of the Act's provisions were set to expire on December 31, 2005, but
Congress made most of them permanent in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act after extensive debate that included modifying some provisions
to address civil liberties concerns. 8'
The Homeland Security Act82 became law on November 25, 2002. Part of the
Act abolishes the Immigration and Naturalization Service and replaces it with a
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services within the new Department of
Homeland Security.83 The goal is to increase cooperation between the immigration
bureaucracy and other agencies in order to enhance the government's ability to
secure borders and prevent the entry of terrorists into the country. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act84 pursued a variety of goals. It created a
Director of National Intelligence, modified standards for deportation and inadmis-
sibility, amended the definition of the crime of providing "material support" to a
terrorist organization, and generally sought to increase the tools available to law
" Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
78 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
79 Id.
80 NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINALENFORCEMENT 10 (2d ed. 2005).
8 Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
82 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
83 Id. §§ 451,471,116 Stat. at 2195-97, 2205.
84 Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
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enforcement and the level of cooperation among the various entities engaged in anti-
crime and anti-terror activities.8 5 The REAL ID Act of 2005 takes a significant step
toward the creation of a national identity card by requiring certain information and
technological features on all state-issued driver's licenses and also narrows the legal
standards for achieving refugee status, all with the ostensible goal of preventing
86terrorist acts.
The Detainee Treatment Act provides a structure for reviewing the decisions of
CSRTs and military commissions, as discussed above.87 The Act also mandates that
interrogations under the auspices of the Department of Defense must conform to the
"United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation" and declares that
"[n]o individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 8 8 The phrase "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment" appears in both the Convention Against Torture
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but is not defined in
either document.89 The Act defines the phrase, in accordance with the United States's
understanding of its obligations under the Convention, as "the cruel, unusual, and
inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution." 9 Another provision of the Act requires CSRTs
to determine "whether any statement[s] derived from or relating to" a prisoner were
"obtained as a result of coercion." 9' If the answer is yes, the CSRT must assess the
statement's "probative value." 92 Finally, the Act provides a defense for officials
charged with using abusive interrogation techniques.93
Most recently, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, which broadens
the definition of "unlawful enemy combatant" to include anyone, citizen or alien, who
85 Id. For a good summary, see ABRAMS, supra note 80, at 33-39.
86 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). For a good analysis, see David Zaring
& Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
17 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
88 DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1002(a), 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2680,2739 (2006). The cur-
rent version of the Army Field Manual on interrogation is DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL No. 2.22-3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS (2006), available at
http://www.army.mil/references/FM2-22.3.pdf.
89 Convention Against Torture, supra note 32, art. 16(1); ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 7.
90 DTA, § 1003(d), 119 Stat. at 2740; see also Resolution of Advice and Consent to Rati-
fication of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, pt. 1(1), 136 CONG. REC. S 17486, S 17491 (Oct. 27, 1990). Similar
language appears in Resolution of Ratification, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, pt. 1(3), 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (Apr. 2, 1992).
91 DTA, § 1005(b), 119 Stat. at 2741.
92 Id.
9' Id. § 1004, 119 Stat. at 2740. For discussion of this new defense, see Sifton, supra note
15, at 509-10.
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has "materially supported hostilities against the United States and its co-belligerents." '
The goal of this broad definition is elusive, because the Act also provides that only
alien unlawful enemy combatants may be tried before military commissions.95 Per-
haps the definition is meant to be read in combination with the Authorization to Use
Military Force, the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld approving de-
tention of combatants for the duration of the relevant conflict (although the Court care-
fully limited its discussion to operations in Afghanistan), and inherent presidential
power, with the goal of allowing detention of any person who fits within it. Whether
the administration will advance this view remains to be seen. The likelihood of a
federal court accepting such a claim is small, I think, especially after Hamdan.
The Military Commissions Act responds directly to Hamdan on the issue of mili-
tary commissions by authorizing and providing a detailed set of rules for them." The
Act also extends the Detainee Treatment Act's provisions for eliminating habeas
corpus- and other legal proceedings-in favor of limited D.C. Circuit review for de-
tention and military commission decisions.97 Although the Act reaffirms the Detainee
Treatment Act's prohibition on the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, it also sharply narrows the acts of U.S. personnel that can be prosecuted
under the War Crimes Act by creating a detailed list and definition of conduct that vio-
lates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 98 Going further, that Act de-
clares that its limited definitions "fully satisfy" the obligation of the United States to
implement Common Article 3 "in the context of an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character," bars the invocation of the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights in "any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding," and states that "the
President has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and appli-
cation of the Geneva Conventions"-albeit in a way that does not "affect the consti-
tutional functions.., of Congress and the judicial branch of the United States." 99
Finally, to ensure that interpretation of the Geneva Conventions-derived conduct
prohibited by the War Crimes Act is entirely a matter of domestic law, the Act
provides that "[n]o foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a
rule of decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting" those provisions.'O°
These recent statutes and ongoing efforts join an array of earlier legislation de-
signed to combat terrorism and other emergencies. I" l Also worth noting-as the
9 MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (2006) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(i) (2006)).
95 Id., 120 Stat. at 2602 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006)).
96 Id. §§ 3, 4, 120 Stat. at 2600-31.
97 Id. §§ 7, 9, 10, 120 Stat. at 2635-37.
98 Id. §§ 5, 6, 120 Stat. at 2631-35.
99 Id.
100 Id. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632.
o1 See, e.g., The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000);
The National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000);The Classification Act, 18 U.S.C.
4001 (a) (2000) (preventing imprisonment or detention of citizens "except pursuant to an Act
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Detainee Treatment Act and to some extent the debate over reauthorizing the USA
PATRIOT ACT indicate-is that Congress has rejected or modified some of the
administration's proposals and may pull back further in years to come. My narrative
here, in other words, should not be mistaken as simply a story about executive ag-
grandizement and legislative abdication-although I think it is clear that executive
power has expanded during the war on terror.
Taken together, these executive and legislative actions demonstrate a shift in the
way the federal government combats terrorism. Traditional law enforcement entities
have been given new powers that have long been on the government's wish list, both
for anti-terror efforts and for ordinary law enforcement purposes. Law enforcement
discretion has expanded. Military and intelligence personnel have taken on a new
prominence. Numerous criminal prosecutions are still being brought against persons
suspected of terrorist activity,' °2 but the administration seems less willing to recognize
criminal trials as central to its anti-terror efforts. In short, the events of 9/11 and the
responses to those events crystallized a new criminal process for terrorism, a process
that in many cases bypasses federal courts and the Department of Justice, and instead
operates through the military and CIA, largely outside the territorial boundaries of
the United States. Some aspects of this process have been curtailed, and more re-
strictions are likely, but it remains significant that many of these practices are now
established as within the realm of "thinkable" or "reasonable" policy options.
C. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's explicit responses to the war on terror have come in a
series of four cases: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 10 3 Rasul v. Bush,"°4 Rumsfeld v. Padilla,°5
and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1°6 Although these decisions have rejected the adminis-
tration's most far-reaching executive power claims, they will not prevent the Bush
administration from accomplishing a net increase in executive power. More important
for purposes of this Article, they are unlikely to have a significant impact on the de-
velopment of a new criminal process by the President, Congress, and the Court itself.
of Congress"). According to one study, 470 statutes provided some kind of emergency autho-
rity to the executive branch by the 1970s. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline
of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1408 (1989). For additional sources discussing recent
legislation, see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1017-18 nn. 19-28 (2003) [hereinafter Gross, Chaos
and Rules].
102 For discussion of recent prosecutions, see Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?, supra note
49; Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 49; and Yin, supra note 18.
103 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
'04 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
'0' 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
'06 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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1. Hamdi, Padilla, and Detained Citizens
Yaser Hamdi, at that time an American citizen, was captured by U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and held in military custody in the United States.' °7 He challenged the
government's authority to detain him and its refusal to give him a hearing at which
he would have the chance to rebut the assertion that he was an "enemy combatant.
108
A fractured Supreme Court ruled in his favor in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.'09 The plurality
opinion by Justice O'Connor declared that "indefinite detention [of citizen enemy com-
batants] for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized" by any relevant federal
statute, but it also found that the AUMF provided authority to detain enemy combat-
ants, including citizens, for the duration of the conflict so long as they received
some form of process."0
The plurality seemed to hint that there is no inherent executive emergency
power to detain indefinitely, and it made clear that any such power would be review-
able."' But the plurality said nothing about inherent power to detain for a limited
period or about what other authority-such as the ability to interrogate-might flow
from such a power."' Instead, emphasizing the role of Congress, the plurality implied
that interrogation may be limited to "appropriate" actions by relevant legislation and
therefore possibly also limited by domestic and international laws that the U.S. recog-
nizes, such as the Geneva Conventions."
13
On the issue of process, the Court applied the balancing test of Mathews v.
Eldridge, which "weigh[s] 'the private interest that will be affected by the official
action' against the Government's asserted interest, 'including the function involved'
and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process."' 4 Accord-
ing to the plurality, Mathews requires
that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.... At the same
time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside
from these core elements, enemy-combatant proceedings may be
107 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510-11.
108 Id. at 510-12.
'09 Id. at 508.
"0 Id. at 521 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). For the plurality, the duration of the
conflict is at least as long as "United States troops are still involved in active combat in
Afghanistan." Id.
"I Id. at 535-37.
112 See id.
"' Id. at 520-21.
14 Id. at 529 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict."5
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, rejected the idea that Congress has
authorized detention of citizens, but he was willing in principle to recognize "an emer-
gency power of necessity . . . limited by the emergency" that would justify un-
authorized executive detention and, presumably, interrogation of a citizen who is
"an imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and its people."'" 6 Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Stevens, rejected an inherent emergency power to detain a citizen
indefinitely, found no adequate congressional authorization, and insisted that the
government must release Hamdi or put him on trial for treason.1 7 Yet his statement
that his views "apply only to citizens" left open the possibility that he would approve
detention and interrogation of an alien (and perhaps even of a citizen for a limited
period)." 8 For his part, Justice Thomas was willing to recognize a broad emergency
power to detain and, presumably, interrogate." 9
Taking these opinions together, Hamdi emerges less as victory for civil liberties
and more as a speed bump on the road to the new criminal process. The procedure
endorsed by the plurality heavily favors the government, and the likelihood that a
citizen suspected of being an enemy combatant and held in military custody can mar-
shal "persuasive" arguments of innocence, even with the aid of counsel, seems small.
Government officials may have performed well at the initial stage of deciding whom
to detain, but the fact that only 38 out of 558 people who appeared before CSRTs
were declared "non-enemy combatants" supports the conclusion that there was little
chance for suspected detainees to prevail. 2 °
"5 Id. at 533. For example,
Hearsay ... may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebut-
table one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the
Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner
meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner
to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside
the criteria.
Id. at 533-34.
6 ld. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I Id. at 554, 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 577.
".. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120 See CSRTSummary, supra note 26; Mark Denbeaux et al., No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT:
The Modem Habeas Corpus?: An Analysis ofthe Proceedings of the Government's Combatant
Review Tribunals at Guantanamo, http://law.shu.edu/news/final no-hearing-hearingsjreport
.pdf; Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees
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Further, the precedent of using the Mathews test, with its balancing methodology
and concern for government interests, to assess the process accorded people swept up
in the war on terror is unlikely to lead to significant restraints on executive authority.
After all, Mathews was widely interpreted as a retreat from rigorous due process
requirements when it was decided, 21 and there is little reason to believe it will oper-
ate differently when the government interest includes national security. In short,
even the most rights-protective reading of Hamdi will leave considerable room for
executive action and relatively little space for the assertion of rights by citizens sus-
pected of being enemy combatants.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla implicated the President's authority to hold in military de-
tention a citizen taken into custody on U.S. soil.122 The Supreme Court avoided that
question by parsing habeas doctrine to hold that Padilla's habeas petition must be dis-
missed because he had failed to sue in the district in which his "immediate custodian"
was located. 123 In dissent, Justice Stevens strongly objected to the majority's effort to
avoid the merits: "Executive detention of subversive citizens... may sometimes be
justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may
not, however, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to ex-
tract information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure."' 24
Padilla filed a new petition in the District of South Carolina. 25 The case ulti-
mately came to the Fourth Circuit, which ruled that the AUMF allows detention
without prosecution for the duration of hostilities of a citizen enemy combatant, re-
gardless of where he or she is captured. 26 The court also stressed that detention with-
out trial is both a legitimate goal on its own and also serves other legitimate goals,
such as "gather[ing] intelligence from the detainee and ... restrict[ing] the detainee's
communication with confederates so as to ensure that the detainee does not pose a
through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, http://law.shu.edu/news/Guantanamo
.report final_2_08_06.pdf. For discussion of Hamdi and the scope of detention under the
laws of war, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2047 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2653, 2658-62 (2005); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, Inter-
national Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005).
12 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
122 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
123 Id. at 432-36.
124 Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 464 n.9 ("Respondent's custodian has
been remarkably candid about the Government's motive in detaining respondent: .'[O]ur in-
terest really in his case is not law enforcement, it is not punishment because he was a terrorist
or working with the terrorists. Our interest at the moment is to try and find out everything
he knows so that hopefully we can stop other terrorist acts .... (alteration in original)).
125 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
126 Id.
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continuing threat to national security even as he is confined."'' 27 The Fourth Circuit
thus expanded on Hamdi's interpretation of "appropriate force" in the AUMF 21 to
approve detention without trial for purposes-isolating, controlling, and thoroughly,
perhaps coercively, interrogating a prisoner-that go beyond the core law of war
concern about preventing enemy soldiers from returning to combat. 129 While argu-
ably consistent with Hamdi, this decision was plainly in tension with Justice Steven's
dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,3" and further review seemed likely. Then, while
Padilla's petition for writ of certiorari was pending, the government indicted him
and sought his transfer from military custody. 3' The Supreme Court approved the
transfer 32 and ultimately denied certiorari.'33
2. Rasul and the Detention of Aliens
Hamdi' s other companion case, Rasul v. Bush, considered whether aliens detained
at Guantanamo could seek writs of habeas corpus in federal court to challenge their
detention.'34 The Court held that federal courts have statutory subject matter juris-
diction to hear habeas corpus claims by aliens in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay and
suggested that jurisdiction might apply anywhere in the world so long as a federal
court has jurisdiction over the applicant's custodian. 35 Put differently, Rasul suggests
127 Id. at 395.
12' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
129 Padilla, 423 F.3d at 395-96.
130 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
131 Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 978, 978 (2006).
132 Id. The Fourth Circuit had denied the motion to transfer. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582
(4th Cir. 2005).
133 For the Supreme Court's approval of the transfer and denial of certiorari, see 126 S. Ct.
978 (2006), and 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).
134 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
131 Id. at 483-84 ("No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners'
custodians. [28 U.S.C. §] 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more." (citation omitted)). Justice
Scalia claimed to understand the Court's decision as "extend[ing] the scope of the habeas
statute to the four comers of the earth" and "permit[ting] an alien captured in a foreign theater
of active combat to bring a § 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense." Id. at 498 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Note, however, that the Court also said the case involved "territory over which
the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty,"'
id. at 475 (majority opinion), and that it did not have to consider the relevance "of the 'long-
standing principle of American law' that congressional legislation is presumed not to have
extraterritorial application unless such intent is clearly manifested," id. at 480. Yet the majority
then went on to say,
Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is
consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At
common law, courts exercised habeas jurisdiction over the claims of
aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as well as the
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that the executive branch could be forced to provide some justification for the pro-
longed detention of anyone anywhere, not just a citizen held in the U.S.'36
Whether or not the geographic implications of the case ultimately prevail-and
the Military Commissions Act will put the Court to the test-the establishment by
the Defense Department of Combatant Status Review Tribunals is as much a response
to Rasul as it is to Hamdi.3 7 But as I have already suggested, the results of those pro-
ceedings may be triumphs of due process only to the extent that obtaining any process
at all is a victory. Consider the Hamdi plurality's statement that "[a] burden-shifting
scheme" would satisfy due process because it "would meet the goal of ensuring that
the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove mili-
tary error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful
support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant."'38 While
the plurality's concern about tourists, journalists, and aid workers is understandable,
this scheme holds out little hope for the local military-age inhabitant. That is to say, the
cases that came before the Court addressed as a group the process due those detained
in indefinite military custody, whether citizen or alien. The minimal procedural pro-
tections accorded in Hamdi might assist citizens, but they are less likely to assist non-
resident aliens who, even after Rasul, are entitled at most to an equivalent amount of
process. 39 Under Hamdi and Rasul, detained aliens risk being deemed enemy com-
batants nearly as a matter of law.
Describing Rasul-and for that matter Hamdi-as triumphs of due process and
the rule of law may thus require defining that idea in almost exclusively formal terms.
The plain fact is that people detained in the war on terror have some procedural protec-
tions as well as the occasional tangible benefit, but their hearings will never approach
the kinds of due process standards that are commonplace in domestic civil or criminal
claims of persons detained in the so-called "exemptjurisdictions," where
ordinary writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign's
control.... Later cases confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not
on formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical
question of "the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion
exercised in fact by the Crown."
Id. at 481-82 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
136 See id. at 483-84.
1' The D.C. Circuit recently concluded that Congress could constitutionally withdraw
habeas jurisdiction from aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States.
See Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682, at *17-35 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 20, 2007).
138 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
"' See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692-94 (2001). Dissenting in Boumediene v.
Bush, Judge Rogers argued that courts hearing habeas petitions brought by aliens detained
outside the U.S. should determine whether the government has "credible evidence" that the
detainee is an enemy combatant and "must accept" that evidence "as true 'if not traversed'
by the person detained." Boumediene, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682, at *90 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2248).
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litigation, and their chances of obtaining relief will be slim regardless of the quality
of evidence against them."4 The mixed quality of the decisions gains force from the
fact that Hamdi and Rasul also suggest a moderate receptiveness to claims of a limited
and justified emergency power to detain and interrogate, even as they signal a familiar
and clear preference for congressional authorization and participation.
3. Hamdan and Military Commissions
In Hamdi, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that "an appropriately autho-
rized and properly constituted military tribunal" could provide sufficient due process
to justify detention of an enemy combatant. 4' Although the plurality did not en-
dorse the specific military commissions established by the Bush administration, its
reading of the AUMF hinted that it would have found the commissions to be "appro-
priately authorized," if not necessarily "properly constituted."'4 2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
raised these issues again.
The Bush administration charged Salim Harndan with conspiracy and brought
him before a military commission.'43 Hardan petitioned for habeas review, claiming
the commission was contrary to law.' 44 On the merits, the Court avoided the question
whether the President may convene military commissions "in cases of 'controlling
necessity." 45 The Court grudgingly seemed to accept that existing statutes, as well
as the AUMF and the Detainee Treatment Act, provided sufficient authority for the
commissions.'" Significantly, however, the majority insisted that Congress had
limited the jurisdiction of military commissions to "'offenses that by statute or by
the law of war may be tried by such military commissions."", 147 Thus, under basic
separation of powers principles, 148 the military commission convened to try Hamdan
'" For related skepticism about Rasul, see Tung Yin, The Role ofArticle III Courts in the
War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BiLL RTs. J. 1061 (2005).
14' Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
142 id.
143 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2753 (2006).
'" Id.
141 Id. at 2774. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341,348 (1952), states that the President "may,
in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions,
and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces
of the United States," but that comment does not clearly apply to the commission established
to try Hamdan. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776.
146 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75. The existing statutes are 10 U.S.C. §§ 821,836 (2000).
147 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 821).
148 The Court observed that the President "may not disregard limitations that Congress
has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers." Id. at 2774 n.23 (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Justice Kennedy also analyzed the case within Justice Jackson's framework. See id. at 2800-01
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
[Vol. 15:765
TERRORISM AND THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS
could be valid only if it was "justified under the 'Constitution and laws,' including
the law of war."' 49
By statute, rules for courts-martial and military commissions must follow pro-
cedures applicable in ordinary criminal cases "so far as [the President] considers prac-
ticable," and rules for military commissions and courts-martial must be "uniform
insofar as practicable."' According to the Court, "the 'practicability' determination
the President has made is insufficient to justify variances from the procedures govern-
ing courts-martial," because the President had in fact made no determination at all
on this specific issue.' 5' Because the procedures that would be used to try Hamdan
varied in significant respects from court-martial rules (such as dispensing with the
right to be present), the prosecution was unauthorized.'52
The Court also ruled that the military commission procedures violated the Geneva
Conventions, which were made applicable by statute.'53 For that to matter, however,
the struggle with al Qaeda must be either an armed conflict between parties to the
Conventions (which it clearly is not) or "a 'conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of'" a party to the Conventions, in which case Common
Article 3 of the Conventions would apply.'54 The Court held that the conflict with
al Qaeda falls into this second category, with the results that Common Article 3 ap-
plies and military commission rules must comply with it.'55 One of the requirements
"' Id. at 2775. Justice Stevens, who at this point spoke only for a plurality, also insisted that
a military commission of the kind convened for Hamdan can consider only "offenses cogni-
zable during time of war," id. at 2776, and that conspiracy is not one of those offenses. See
id. at 2777-85 (plurality opinion).
150 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000).
'' Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791. Such a determination would be entitled to some deference,
but not as much as the determination that it is impracticable to follow the rules of ordinary
criminal cases, which the Court assumed was entitled to "complete deference." Id. at 2791
& n.51.
152 See id. at 2792.
"' See id. at 2793-98. The Court left open the possibility that the Conventions apply of
their own force and can be asserted by individual claimants. See id. at 2794. For further dis-
cussion, see infra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
'14 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting Common Article 3).
"' Id. at 2795-96. The full scope of this holding is unclear for two reasons. First, the extent
of the conflict is ambiguous because the nature of al Qaeda is amorphous and its "membership"
is fluid. See FAISAL DEVJI, LANDSCAPES OF THE JIHAD: MiIJTANCY, MORALITY, MODERNITY
19-20 (2005). Second, the extent to which the Court equated a struggle with al Qaeda with
the "war on terror" is not clear. Most commentators reject the notion that the laws of war
apply to the war on terror in its entirety. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Situation of
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 183, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15,2006) ("The war
on terror, as such, does not constitute an armed conflict for the purposes of the applicability
of international humanitarian law."); DuFFY, supra note 4, at 250-55; George H. Aldrich,
The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891
(2002); Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and
Detentions Abroad in the "War on Terror," 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 39, March 2005; The
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of Common Article 3 is that trials must be before "regularly constituted" courts, and the
Supreme Court found that military commissions could not meet that standard because
they were not already established, in force, or justified by some "practical need."' 116
In short, Hamdan accepts that Congress authorized the use of military com-
missions, but rejects the specific method that the administration selected to put them
into practice.'57 Along the way, the Court rejected the administration's most far-
reaching executive power claims and insisted on compliance with Congress's deter-
mination that traditional standards of international humanitarian law must apply to
military action.158 Further, Hamdan's holding that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applies to the conflict with al Qaeda meant that U.S. personnel who
violated its provisions could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act as it existed
before the Military Commissions Act extensively modified it. 159
But the penultimate line of the Hamdan majority opinion observed that "Hamdan
does not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government's power to detain
him for the duration of... hostilities."-which in this context apparently means the
conflict with al Qaeda and not the conflict with Afghanistan. 60 That statement means
no one will be released from detention as a result of Hamdan. Hamdi and Rasul will
continue to govern that issue, and as we have seen, their requirements do little to pre-
vent indefinite detention. Nor does Hamdan prevent military commissions. Rather,
it simply required-at most-statutory authorization, which the Military Commissions
Act now provides. 61 In Youngstown terms, the issue has gone from category three to
category one, and convincing a majority of the Court to strike down a scheme backed
by both political branches will be much more difficult.
Perhaps most significantly, Hamdan ratifies the war model for confronting terror-
ism. The consequence, in turn, is not simply the beneficent one that Common Article
3 applies. Indeed, Common Article 3's application as a backstop indicates that the
fundamental issue in cases like this is how few rights will be accorded to people
caught up in that war. There is no indication that anything close to a majority of the
Court will treat these people as full rights-holders under the Constitution. For the
purposes of this Article, in other words, the Court has as much as said there is a new
Cleveland Principles of International Law on the Detention and Treatment of Persons in
Connection with "The Global War on Terror," No. 1 (Oct. 7, 2005), http://www.law.case
.edu/centers/cox/content.asp?contentid=85.
'56 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97. Justice Stevens, again speaking only for a plurality,
also contended that the failure to require the presence of the accused at the trial violated
Common Article 3. See id. at 2797-98.
157 See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 153-56.
159 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000 & Supp. IV 2005).
'60 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
161 The administration could also have tried to make a convincing "practicability" showing-
although such an attempt might not have satisfied the Geneva Conventions and in fact would
have put significant pressure on the Court's reliance upon them.
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criminal process for the war on terror (even recognizing that at the same time the
Court has also said that there is no need for a new type of wartime process). Going
further, Hamdan' s acceptance of the war model reveals the limits of the Court's power.
Once the executive branch declared that terrorism requires war-and especially once
Congress authorized the use of military force-the Court was essentially powerless
to say differently. Taken as a group, then, the detention cases (a category in which
I include Hamdan) work within the war model, not against it, and they seek to mitigate
its harshest effects.
Finally, the Court's easy acceptance of the war model and its effort to find a mean-
ingful accommodation between the rule of law and the exigencies of conflict should
also provoke the question whether it has adopted the same approach in other "wars,"
such as the war on crime and the war on drugs. As the last two parts of this Article
will describe, the answer is a resounding "yes." And if this last observation is true, then
being a "full rights-holder" may not be all that different from being in Hamdan' s shoes.
HI. CRIMINAL PROCESSES, OLD AND NEW
The last section of Part I explained how one aspect of the new criminal process-
extended detention-survived Supreme Court review relatively intact, while another
aspect-the military commission--can satisfy constitutional norms only if Congress
plays a larger role than the Bush administration would desire. This short part broadens
the focus to compare and evaluate the traditional and new criminal processes at a
policy level. To that end, I sketch what might best be called ideal types of each pro-
cess: police investigations leading to actual trials for the traditional criminal process,
and counterintelligence operations leading to military tribunals along the lines of
those created by the Bush administration before Hamdan. The second section of this
part asks whether we still have a meaningful choice between the two types of process,
and sets the stage for a discussion of constitutional law and the emergency power
in the last parts of this Article.
A. Comparing Traditional and New Criminal Processes
Under the traditional view, investigation with the goal of proving criminal charges
in an ordinary criminal court is presumptively the appropriate way to assess the respon-
sibility of and assign punishment to people who have carried out, attempted to carry
out, or conspired to carry out crimes, including terrorist attacks. 162 Before 9/11, the
162 For a good example of the claim that traditional criminal processes, slightly modified,
are well-suited to dealing with terrorism, see HEYMANN, supra note 12. For an interesting
argument in favor of military commissions by the Chief Prosecutor of the Office of Military
Commissions, see Morris D. Davis, The Role of Military Commissions in the Global War on
Terrorism, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 537 (2006). For good discussions of the reasons for
and against using military tribunals or ordinary courts for the trial of terrorists, see Agora:
Military Commissions, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 320 (2002), especially the contributions by Ruth
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United States conducted several successful trials of accused terrorists, including the
trial of the first World Trade Center bombers. Suspected terrorists or persons with
links to them continue to be prosecuted in U.S. courts. 163
Supporters of traditional process can point to several desirable features. Investi-
gations are conducted by an increasingly professional force of police who have been
instructed in the constitutional, statutory, and administrative rules relevant to police
activity.' 64 By contrast, the new criminal process relies on military action or counter-
intelligence networks that are institutionally less willing, able, required, or even suited
to conform to such norms. Further, the constitutional and other rules for the conduct
of criminal trials are well-developed and easily applied, and the substantive rules of
federal criminal law are grounded in a large body of statutes, rules, and case-law.1 65
Yet the existence of the military justice system, with a separate investigatory,
prosecutorial, and judicial system codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice,66
confirms that traditional processes have never been the only option. So, too, a long
history of creating and using special military tribunals supports their legitimacy in
at least some circumstances. 67 In addition, the military justice system has expertise
in applying criminal law principles and the laws of war--expertise that is also avail-
able to personnel who participate in military commissions-while some of the federal
criminal statutes dealing with terrorism have received little interpretation. Finally,
counter-terror activities-at least those with international overtones-have never been
the sole province of traditional, domestic law enforcement and criminal courts.
That said, the primary advantage of the new criminal process is its flexibility
and efficiency. To the extent constitutional and statutory rules apply more leniently,
executive officials have discretion to craft strategies for the specific needs of a par-
ticular investigation or other activity. Investigators can engage in broad collection of
information about people who have little or no apparent relation to terrorist activities
(depending, of course, upon how one defines "terrorist activities" in light of such
things as the material support statutes). 168 Once suspects are identified, they can be
detained, or not, and officials can decide to interrogate, or not, to bring charges, or not,
bound by only mild time constraints. Because interrogation is not necessarily directed
at obtaining admissible evidence, rules that would ordinarily limit the available range
Wedgwood and Harold Koh.
163 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
164 For discussion of the constitutional significance of professionalism and training, see
infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
'65 For example, Title 18 of the U.S. Code and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
'66 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
167 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 250-52 (2002). For more detailed histories, see LouIS
FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE
WAR ON TERRORISM (2005); David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?:
Judging the 21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REv. 2005, 2023-73 (2003).
168 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2000 & Supp. IV 2005).
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of tactics may not apply. Further, the new criminal process includes the possibility
of having the "sentence" follow immediately after the investigation, as with efforts
to kill suspected terrorists rather than put them on trial. 69
Traditional processes accord familiar rights to the subjects of investigations, as
well as at trial. 70 By contrast, although constitutional norms apply to at least some
aspects of the new criminal process, current rules for counter-terror activities provide
few protections.' 7 ' Once charged, a defendant in a traditional case has a broad right
to counsel of his or her choosing, 7 1 whereas defendants in military proceedings will
be assigned a military lawyer. 73 This disparity is not as great as it might first appear,
however, because the formal right to counsel of one's choice in federal court is often
limited by the inability of many defendants to pay for an attorney, so that they must
rely on an often overburdened court-appointed lawyer. For their part, military lawyers
are ethically bound and fully able to represent their clients zealously, and defendants
before a military tribunal have a qualified right to obtain civilian counsel.'
In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence draw upon long experience with
problems of proof to provide a framework for advocacy that largely focuses on the
most reliable evidence. The Classified Information Procedures Act adds a method
for addressing many-but not all--of the government's concerns about disclosing
sensitive information.'75 Defendants in a criminal trial may invoke the aid of the court
to obtain documents or the testimony of expert witnesses, and prosecutors are required
to disclose exculpatory evidence. 7 6 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to
military tribunals, with the result that relaxed standards of relevance and admissibility
are available.'77 To some observers, relaxation of traditional rules is a common-sense
step toward realistic standards of evidence, while others would highlight the risks of
169 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
170 Examples include the warrant requirement, see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551 (2004); the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination, see U.S. CONST. amend.
V; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); the exclusionary rule, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); and the due-process protection against "conscience-shocking" conduct, see
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Part III of this Article provides an extended quali-
fication of this broad description.
'' See infra notes 247-54 and accompanying text (discussing the complexity of extra-
territoriality doctrine).
172 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
173 Although a military defendant will be "detailed" a military lawyer as defense counsel,
10 U.S.C. § 827 (2000), this does not preclude the defendant from obtaining civilian counsel
at his expense. 10 U.S.C. § 838 (2000).
17' For example, civilian counsel appearing before military commissions must be U.S. citi-
zens, members of a domestic bar, and have a security clearance. See MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-
366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2610 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b)(3)
(2006)).
171 See 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2000).
176 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
177 MCA, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608-09 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 949a (2006)).
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using prejudicial, inaccurate, or misleading evidence-particularly when the infor-
mation was obtained by coercion and presented at secret proceedings. 178
The decision-makers at a traditional trial (including the jury) and on appeal are
independent, acquittals are final, and the appellate process provides rigorous review.
By contrast, military commissions do away with the need for a randomly selected jury
which must be protected from threats or retaliation-a particularly serious issue in
the terrorism context--even as it must be educated about the issues in the trial. The
members of military commissions and review panels are appointed officials within
the command hierarchy of the U.S. military. 7 9 They may be more capable and better
prepared for trial than the average juror, but their independence will be suspect be-
cause they will have been selected by and will be a part of the executive branch. 180
Review of military commission decisions in federal court is limited,'81 which serves
the government's interests in finality, but increases the possibility that errors will go
undetected and uncorrected.
Further, defendants in federal court have a right to a speedy trial, 182 and acquittal
usually means that they will be freed. For detainees in the war on terror, the combi-
nation of detention and military commissions may translate into no trial or a trial after
several years in custody, and acquittal may not lead to release if executive officials
decide it is important to continue holding such detainees (and if habeas review remains
unavailable or limited on the merits). The critical fact for detention is the duration
of the conflict, and if the conflict is the war on terror, the end is nowhere in sight.
Importantly, traditional processes need not be static. The federal courts draw on
a common-law tradition that takes as a fundamental premise the need for the law to
adapt to changing circumstances. Consistent with evolving constitutional norms,
law enforcement agencies and courts can experiment with procedural mechanisms,
particularly if those experiments would maintain the primacy of core traditional pro-
cesses (although the degree of permissible experimentation is a topic of fierce debate).
Military commissions were not used for trying al Qaeda-style terrorists before 9/11,
and although the commissions can draw on the experience of the military justice
'78 The MCA provides that a statement obtained by coercion may be admitted if it is reli-
able, its admission would serve the interests of justice, and it was not obtained by the use of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Id., 120 Stat. at 2607 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 948r(c)-(d) (2006)).
"9 Id., 120 Stat. at 2603-04 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948i, 948j (2006)).
"s0 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2806-07 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Note that the MCA borrowed from the UCMJ to create some protections for members of
military commissions. See MCA, § 3(a)(l), 120 Stat. at 2604 (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. §§ 948j(f), 949b (2006)). The Navy's refusal to promote and instead end the career of
Hamdan's military lawyer two weeks after the Supreme Court ruled in his favor suggests the
need for such protections. See Carol Rosenberg, Lawyer Is Denied Promotion, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 8, 2006, at Al.
18' DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,2741-43 (2006); MCA, § 9, 120
Stat. at 2636-37.
182 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000).
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system, the lack of precedents and processes that have evolved over time may hamper
their effectiveness, at least in the initial stages. Moreover, to the extent they remain
extraordinary courts (even if "regularly constituted") and are infrequently used com-
pared to the routine of the traditional process, including traditional military criminal
processes, the risk exists that they will be unable to develop into efficient, reliable,
and just institutions.
The characteristics of the traditional criminal process and trial resonate with his-
tory and with ideas of due process to form a system that is widely perceived as fair
both in the aggregate and in most individual cases. The perception of fairness in the
federal system also derives from the separation of powers. Life-tenured judges and
the requirement of jury trials provide examples of separation of powers at work in
the traditional criminal trial, and they serve as counterweights to executive power. 183
Significantly, this familiar model of separated power goes beyond control of power
at the highest levels and beyond providing counterweights in the machinery of law-
making, law enforcement, and legal interpretation. Separation of powers is also, and
at least as importantly, about fragmenting the government's ability to exercise power
over individual lives and preventing total control over people's bodies, minds, and cir-
cumstances. Robert Cover accurately observed that "[1]egal interpretation takes place
in a field of pain and death,"' ' but separation of powers may lower the body count.
Because separation of powers constraints are lowered for the new criminal pro-
cess, officials have greater control over the present circumstances and ultimate fate
of the defendant. Detention, coercive interrogation, military trial, and punishment,
summary or otherwise, form an overall approach that treats the suspected terrorist or
associate of terrorists as a person over whose body and circumstances the govern-
ment should exercise total and exclusive power. To many readers, this will seem a
patently illegitimate goal, but if the magnitude of the threat of terrorism is suffi-
ciently great, one can easily imagine the argument that such an approach is justified,
although perhaps only as a temporary measure.
Finally, the new criminal process serves a domestic political function. Terrorism
can cause panic and uncertainty with wide ranging impact, and elected leaders may
respond by seeking to project an image of resoluteness and reassurance. Forceful,
sweeping action-that is, a new level of state violence that is central to the new crimi-
nal process-is one way to achieve this goal. I suspect most readers will find this to
be a thoroughly inadequate "justification" and may even interpret it as authoritarian.
Yet such action can be described as drawing, however shakily, on the separation of
powers because it rests on an idea of inherent but limited executive authority to
defend the nation against attack. And, support in liberal theory for some kind of
183 For elaboration of this claim with respect to juries, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81-119 (1998).
184 ROBERT M. COVER, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986), reprinted in
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow
et al. eds., 1992).
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"prerogative power" goes back at least to Locke.185 The constitutional merits and
obvious risks of this approach are a topic for the last part of this Article.
B. Choosing a Process
In comparing the traditional and new criminal processes, I have indulged two
assumptions. The first is that the traditional criminal process is presumptively superior
to the new criminal process for addressing issues relating to terrorism, despite the
new criminal process's greater flexibility. The second is that we can easily choose
between the two forms of process. Both assumptions are open to question.
I referred to the first objection in the Introduction. Even if there should be a pre-
sumption in favor of traditional criminal processes in normal times, the "war on terror"
puts us in a situation in which the presumption has shifted. Hard-headed analysis,
in short, arguably suggests that we are in the exceptional situation in which the "war
approach" trumps the "crime approach," with the result that the new criminal process
has also become the new presumption. Some things, in other words, have changed
after all, at least for a while. To some extent, as I also indicated in the Introduction,
the answer to this objection depends on whether one accepts the claim that everything
changed and we are at war. It also relies on the idea that exceptional situations require
different legal rules-an idea that I discuss more fully in the last Part of this Article.
Second, one could take a further step to argue there is simply no basis for a pre-
sumption in favor of the traditional criminal process. Terrorism is not just a problem
of law enforcement; it also implicates national security, diplomacy, economic policy,
immigration, the role of the military, and many other issues. Seen in this way, reason-
able people can easily assert that, at best, traditional criminal processes should be
merely one option along with other more violent, but perhaps also more effective,
responses. This objection, then, goes beyond the war/crime dichotomy to suggest
that terrorism is a complex issue that requires a nuanced and flexible response along
a variety of policy and legal paths. A narrow focus on one form of legal process is
short-sighted and ultimately ineffective.
I do not wish to dispute this point at a general level, except to suggest that it ob-
viously also applies to the problem of "ordinary" crime and any other issue of public
importance, as much as to the problem of terrorism. Once faced with this insight,
moreover, we still have to decide what processes to use under what circumstances.
Traditional criminal processes remain an available choice, and we need some way
of deciding what kind of process is best in what situations. Also, to the extent issues
once seen as the province primarily of legal process and ordinary policing are now
seen as larger issues of social concern along a variety of metrics, this shift simply
reflects the fact of increasing rationalization and expansion of modem state power. 1
86
'85 See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-80 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988) (1690).
186 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED": LECTURES AT THE CO1IfGE
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The interesting question, especially for purposes of this Article, is the role that emer-
gencies play in this process.
Most important, one could dispute that the traditional process exists at all. It
may once have existed, but we abandoned it long ago, and the new criminal process
is simply the process that we have achieved. Less dramatically, one might argue that
the new criminal process is a permanent part of our everyday criminal process, along-
side and partially overriding the remnants of the traditional process. The rise of the
plea bargain as the overwhelmingly dominant mode of resolving criminal charges
is but one example of the ways in which traditional processes have eroded (in this
instance, in favor of what looks more like an administrative proceeding).
If either version of this third objection has weight, then we have already made
a choice. The idea that the new criminal process is already well established also raises
important issues about the content of constitutional rules on criminal procedure out-
side the contexts of detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists. So, too, the
possibility that we already live under the new criminal process poses questions about
the difference between exceptional and ordinary conditions, and between emergency
and normal powers. The next Part considers the ways in which the new criminal
process is already woven into our constitutional fabric, while the last Part considers
the issues raised by the emergency power and the convergence in the new criminal
process of military and police action.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS
Outside the case-law of the war on terror, in the realm of "everyday" criminal
procedure, the new criminal process is already well entrenched. Indeed, a survey
of established and developing criminal procedure doctrine suggests that the scope
of the new criminal process is broader and deeper than a mere recitation of actions
taken in the war on terror might suggest. This Part looks more closely at everyday
constitutional law to describe the ways in which the new criminal process has already
become the criminal procedure that we have.
A. Rights in the Modem State
One reason for constitutional law's embrace of the new criminal process is that
doctrine has changed to reflect the needs of the modem regulatory state. Civil rights
DE FRANCE, 1975-76, at 246 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans.,
2003) (discussing the ways in which modem sovereignty employs pervasive regulation "to
establish an equilibrium" and "optimize a state of life"). Agamben's description is more sugges-
tive: "the sovereign is entering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only with the jurist
but also with the doctor, the scientist, the expert, and the priest." AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER,
supra note 7, at 122. For a more straightforward account in the specific context of criminal
law and procedure's regulation of the family, see Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006).
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play a central role in these regulatory processes. After all, rights are largely dependent
upon and exist only in relation to state power. As a result, the expansion of civil
rights and liberties in the second half of the twentieth century must be placed in the
context of an increase in state power that is at least as significant, especially in terms
of the government's power to influence, intervene in, and even control our daily lives,
for better or worse. And, as rights are entwined with state interests, they also change
in ways that reflect those interests. 87 Agamben describes this process in language
that suggests, perhaps hyperbolically, the dire potential of rights discourse:
the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their
conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a
tacit but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the state
order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the
very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate them-
selves.
88
Whether or not "dreadful" is a fair conclusion, 89 Agamben's analysis suggests that
reliance on civil liberties arguments to counter the new criminal process may expand
or entrench certain rights, but only against a background of increased state power
and regulation.'90
187 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1034 (1995) ("Wherever the regulatory state engages in any form of compelled
information gathering (and it does so everywhere), there is an enormous cost to taking privacy
interests seriously.").
188 AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER, supra note 7, at 121. For a strong criticism of Agamben's
views on human rights, see Volker Heins, Giorgio Agamben and the Current State of Affairs
in Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Policy, 6 GERMAN L.J. 845 (2005), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.con/pdf/Vol06NoO5/PDFVol_06_No_05_845_860_Articles
_Heins.pdf. To my mind, Heins seems more often to misunderstand Agamben's arguments,
and his real objection is normative rather than analytical: Agamben's writings stray too close
to the work of Carl Schmitt, and his willingness to explore commonalities between authori-
tarian and democratic regimes is simply illegitimate. See id. at 860 ("Ultimately, he offers
a version of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty that changes its political valence and downplays
the difference between liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship-a difference about
which Adomo once said that it 'is a total difference. And I would say,' he added, 'that it would
be abstract and in a problematic way fanatical if one were to ignore this difference."'). For
a more persuasive discussion that is sanguine about-and thus implicitly critical of Agamben's
position on-the interplay between rights and regulation in modem states, see Mattias
Kumm, Who's Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the
Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341 (2006), available at http://www
.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol07NoO4/PDFVol-07-No-04_341-370_Articles
%20Kumm.pdf.
189 Cf. Vik Kanwar, Book Review, 4 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 567,568 (2006), available at http://
icon.oxford.journals.org/cgi/reprint/4/3/567 ("[O]ne must become accustomed to [Agamben's]
signature rhetorical devices of hyperbole, paradox, and 'indistinction."').
" This is not to say that critical approaches reject rights discourse altogether. See, e.g,
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1. Discretionary Power
The first step in examining the interplay of constitutional law and the new criminal
process is to consider the role that constitutional law plays in the delegation of power
to federal and state officials. The scope of authority to investigate and interrogate an
individual is not detailed in any federal statute or regulation. The Attorney General
may appoint officials "to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States" and
"to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters... as may be directed
by the Attorney General."'' Department of Justice regulations in turn delegate the
authority to investigate to the FBI. 192 For their part, FBI agents have been given spe-
cific statutory authority to "carry firearms, serve warrants and subpoenas... and make
arrests.' 93 Other grants of authority take the same general tone.' 9
In short, federal statutes do not specify either the powers of law enforcement
officers or the limits on their powers.' 5 Nor has the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution requires such a statute.'" Instead, the specific powers of federal law en-
forcement officers derive from ideas about the nature of executive authority, com-
mon law, and constitutional restrictions on investigative techniques. 97 Another way
Patrick Hanafin, The Writer's Refusal and the Law's Malady, 31 J.L. & Soc'Y 3 (2004),
reprinted in LAW AND LrrERATURE 3, 12 (Patrick Hanafin et al. eds., 2004) (describing efforts
"to use the rhetoric of rights to subvert its normal functioning in the hands of the disciplinary
state"); Michel Foucault, Is It Useless to Revolt?, LE MONDE, May 11-12, 1979, at 1,
reprinted in JANET AFARY & KEVIN B. ANDERSON, FOUCAULT AND THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION: GENDER AND THE SEDUCTIONS OF ISLAMISM 263,266 (Karen de Bruin trans.,
2005) ("Inviolable laws and unrestricted rights must always be opposed to power."). Still,
rights in these formulations are plainly different from or at least more than juridical rights.
191 28 U.S.C. § 533 (Supp. 1II 2004). Other sections provide authority to investigate
specific crimes. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 535 (crimes involving government officers and employees),
538 (aircraft piracy), 540 (felonious killings of state or local law enforcement officers), 540A
(violent crimes against travelers), 540B (serial killings) (2000).
192 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2006); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 8.1, 8.2 (2006) (power to seize property
delegated to FBI).
193 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2000).
'94 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 3107 (2000) (authority to serve warrants and make seizures pur-
suant to them); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(a), (d) (search warrants may be issued upon the request
of federal law enforcement officers so authorized by the Attorney General). For Department
of Justice policies on subpoenas, interrogation, indictment, and arrest of members of the news
media, see 28 C.F.R. § 59.1-.6 (2006).
... This is despite the demand thirty years ago by a special Senate committee for "[a] basic
law-a charter of powers, duties, and limitations-[for the] ... FBI's domestic intelligence
[activities]." SENATE SELECTCOMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTALOPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIvrrTES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIvrnEs AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS,
S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. II, at x (1976).
196 E.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736-37 (2004) (rejecting the idea that
an "officially sanctioned" detention is arbitrary merely because it "exceed[s] positive autho-
rization to detain").
'9' E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (relying on common law
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of making this point is to say that unless the Constitution prohibits a particular
practice, law enforcement officials have broad discretion to investigate crimes; search,
seize, and interrogate people; and search and seize property. The picture is more com-
plicated at the state level because many state and local governments have adopted
detailed procedures for arrests, use of force, and other practices. 198 Police depart-
ments, like the military, tend to operate according to rules and procedures, and they
are becoming increasingly professionalized. But those rules still leave a great deal of
room for discretion, and the Constitution has relatively little to say about the scope
of that discretion.
Importantly, this approach to state violence and state law enforcement power is
not the only way to structure governmental authority. When the Supreme Court of
Israel ruled that the General Security Service could not use coercive interrogation
techniques on detained Palestinians, it grounded its decision on the proposition that,
without a positive grant of authority, executive officials have no power to act." The
court explained that, "[i]n a state adhering to the Rule of Law, interrogations are there-
fore not permitted in [the] absence of clear statutory authorization."2 °° It followed
that "an administrative body, seeking to interrogate an individual... must point to
the explicit statutory provision which legally empowers it."' ' Going further, the
court declared that where there is no legislation that provides authority to executive
officials, "the relevant field is entirely occupied by the principle of individual free-
dom. ''20 2 Whether or not such an approach is desirable, it is emphatically not the one
taken by the U.S. legal system.2°3
2. Discretionary Rights
The next step is to examine the nature of constitutional rights in contemporary
U.S. legal discourse. In 1886, the Supreme Court spoke in Boyd v. United States of an
"indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property," such
that the rights articulated in "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other" and "should be liberally construed. '21 4 Under this conception, constitutional
powers of arrest to uphold the power to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests).
98 For discussion of state law and additional discussion of federal law, see John T. Parry,
Judicial Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 73, 122-25 (2002) [hereinafter Parry, Judicial Restraints].
199 HJC 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, reprinted
in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1478 (1999).
200 Id.
201 id.
202 Id., 38 I.L.M. at 1479.
203 The Public Committee rule may echo European jurisprudence. See Lord Irvine of Lairg,
Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (2001); Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363, 394-10 (1982).
204 116 U.S. 616, 630, 635 (1886).
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rights must be strong, broad, and nearly absolute rules in order to protect individual
privacy and liberty from possibly arbitrary government authority.
The Boyd approach is a perfectly sensible way to think about rights, but it bears
little resemblance to the analytical structure of contemporary constitutional doctrine.
As Sanford Levinson recently explained in the context of the First Amendment, enu-
meration of a right, even one prefaced with the command that "no law" shall be passed
abridging it (as opposed to the Fourth Amendment's textual embrace of reasonable-
ness), does not make the scope of that right clear.2 5 "The fact is that 'no law' does
not mean 'no law'; rather, it means, in our contemporary world, that the state must
demonstrate what we call a 'compelling state interest' in order to justify the trans-
gression of the stipulated norm."2 "6 With equal candor, Justice Scalia wrote for the
Court in Anderson v. Creighton that "regardless of the terminology used, the precise
content of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assess-
ment of what accommodation between governmental need and individual freedom
is reasonable." 2°7
Further, as William Stuntz has noted, Boyd is out of sync with the needs and dis-
courses of the modern regulatory state, which requires a broad and intrusive investiga-
tory power.28 By the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had declared in Schmerber v.
California that the privilege against self-incrimination "has never been given the full
scope which the values it helps to protect suggest. ' 209 As for the Fourth Amendment,
the Court said in the same case that its "proper function is to constrain, not against all
intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances,
or which are made in an improper manner. ' 210 One year later, the Court stressed that
the government's "interest in solving crime" is relevant to the reasonableness of a
search, and it introduced the doctrine that the Fourth Amendment protects only reason-
able expectations of privacy, not all privacy interests.21 The result is that "rights"
205 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA.
L. REV. 699, 718-19 (2006).
206 Id. at 719.
207 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
208 Stuntz, supra note 187, at 1030-31, 1052-54.
209 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
210 Id. at 768.
211 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 (1967). The Warren Court's legacy in criminal procedure includes
the idea of limiting police discretion. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998). But because the Court's methodology
often turned on reasonableness and balancing tests, the resulting doctrine did not eliminate
discretion so much as channel and manage it. Discretion thus became a legitimate interest
with the power to shape evolving doctrine. For good discussions of the ways in which the
Warren Court's methodology had consequences that the Court may not have intended, see
Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth
Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33 (2005); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward
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in contemporary criminal procedure doctrine are rarely more than the term we use
to describe a balance of policies and interests that ends up favoring the individual
claimant rather than the government.2t 2
Under the reasonableness approach to criminal procedure, the privacy interests
that the Constitution protects have been steadily narrowed and watered down.213 The
Court's decision in Kyllo v. United States, which forbade "obtaining [without a war-
rant and] by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of
the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,' ',214 only confirms that conclusion. In applying
the idea of reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court described the "the interior
of homes" as the baseline,2 5 so that the domestic space is the presumptive location
of constitutional privacy, and the Fourth Amendment risks ending up protecting a
limited list of places, not people.21 6
Further, the Court has signaled a willingness not to impose constitutional restric-
tions when other sources of norms might suffice to manage police discretion. Last
Term for example, in Hudson v. Michigan, the Court refused to apply the exclusion-
ary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce rule, in part
because the professionalism of police departments leads them to take constitutional
a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
119 (1989).
212 For a classic discussion of rights and balancing tests, see Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1371-73 (1984). For the argument that legal rights have value
precisely because they contribute "to the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental activi-
ties" in a properly constructed system, see David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging
the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1056 (2005). While Super
describes rights as part of the balance rather than a way of describing certain results of the
balance, his larger claim that rights have value because of their utility to governance dovetails
with my argument. For a different account of the utility of rights, see Kumm, supra note 188,
at 368 ("The point of human and constitutional rights is to focus and structure the court's
assessment of whether the actions of public institutions are reasonable under the circumstances.
The language of rights has provided the authorization for courts to play a role in protecting
the legitimate interests of individuals, thereby helping to hold public institutions to standards
of good government in liberal constitutional democracies worldwide.").
213 See Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002).
214 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
215 See id. ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes-the prototypical and hence
most commonly litigated area of protected privacy--there is a ready criterion, with roots deep
in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged
to be reasonable.").
216 See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 Miss.
L.J. 143, 160 (2002); cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."). For discussion of the ways in which substantive criminal law intrudes into the
home in multiple ways, see Suk, supra note 186.
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rights seriously and to instruct officers in appropriate rules of conduct.217 A blunter
characterization of this holding is that making constitutional law would be redun-
dant. Indeed, Justice Kennedy suggested that, if "training police officers and imposing
discipline for failures to act competently and lawfully... prove[s] ineffective," those
procedures "can be fortified with more detailed regulations or legislation"-not with
constitutional law in the form of constitutionally mandated remedies.218
Hudson's preference for adaptable rules of internal police regulations instead of
constitutional law is metonymic for the shift to the new criminal processes. Further,
the Court's deliberate choice of internal police regulation over constitutional law
echoes Hannah Arendt' s distinction between totalitarian law and positive law, where
"positive laws.., are primarily designed to function as stabilizing factors for the ever
changing movements of men," while in a totalitarian state "all laws have become laws
of movement. ' 219 Extending Arendt's analysis, the tendency of modern states to em-
brace flexibility and movement over permanence-a tendency reflected to a signifi-
cant degree in administrative law itself---thus carries enormous risks for what she calls
"the living space of freedom." 220 To the extent this similarity is more than an echo,
217 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006).
218 Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). I do not think Hudson can be described more simply
as an exercise in judicial restraint. The Court did not decide the case on non-constitutional
grounds; nor did it put off making constitutional law in deference to local law enforcement
procedures. Instead, it declared a constitutional rule-no exclusionary rule for knock-and-
announce violations-and its decision turned in part on the idea that internal police regulation
is an effective substitute for constitutional law. Note that the Court also rested its decision
on the availability of civil remedies for violations of the knock-and-announce rule. See id.
at 2167-68 (majority opinion); id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As my discussion of
remedies later in this Part indicates, however, damages claims are unlikely to generate robust
constitutional doctrine. Nor does Hudson make a contrary claim. Justice Scalia's precise words
are revealing: "As far as we know, civil liability is an effective deterrent here, as we have as-
sumed it is in other contexts." Id. at 2167-68 (majority opinion). Doctrine thus results from
reasonable balancing of all the relevant interests, but factors in play are often based on nothing
more than reasonable assumptions, perhaps even guesses. With this kind of methodology,
constitutional rules will not place significant constraints on official discretion.
219 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTAIUTARIANISM 463 (new ed. 1979); see also
id. at 464 ("In these ideologies, the term 'law' itself changed its meaning: from expressing
the framework of stability within which human actions and motions can take place, it became
the expression of the motion itself.").
220 Id. at 466. Nor is this claim at all foreign to the study of administrative law. See KENNET
CuLPDAVIS, DISCREIONARYJUSTICE: APRELIMINARYINQUIRY (1971). The Supreme Court's
approach to administrative law recognizes that it is a "law of movement," so much so that
the Supreme Court has announced that federal court decisions construing ambiguous regulatory
statutes are "not authoritative" and can be disregarded by the agencies charged with inter-
preting those statutes. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967 (2005); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw.U.L. REV. (forth-
coming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=900582.
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it also dovetails with Agamben's effort to understand "the otherwise incomprehen-
sible rapidity with which twentieth-century parliamentary democracies were able to
turn into totalitarian states and with which this century's totalitarian states were able
to be converted, almost without interruption, into parliamentary democracies."22' To
be clear, I am not arguing that the United States is a totalitarian state.2 22 Rather, I
mean to suggest that developments such as the new criminal process rest less on ideas
specific to liberal democracy and more on ideas of governance that are common to
modem states in general.
The Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio223 exemplifies the importance
of discretion and reasonableness in contemporary constitutional doctrine. Terry held
that the Fourth Amendment permits police who have reasonable suspicion that a per-
son may be engaged in criminal behavior to detain that person briefly and, if there
is reason to believe that person may be armed, to also frisk him for weapons.224 In his
majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren never asked whether a state or local statute au-
thorized this conduct.22 He simply assumed that police officers have authority to stop
and frisk potentially dangerous people, unless the Constitution limits this authority.226
In addition, the Court's analysis began with the assertion-reminiscent of Boyd-that
221 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 7, at 122. Making this connection requires a bit
more work. For Agamben, this process reflects the fact that,
[i]n both cases, these transformations were produced in a context in
which for quite some time politics had already turned into biopolitics,
and in which the only real question to be decided was which form of
organization would be best suited to the task of assuring the care, control,
and use of bare life.
Id. Thus, he does not draw the strong distinction between liberal democracy and totalitarian
states that Arendt appears to describe and instead stresses a common approach to governing
based on Michel Foucault's idea of biopolitics and an idea of western political history as being
as much about continuities as disjunctures. See id. at 119; see also FOUCAULT, supra note 186,
at 241,245-47 (defining "biopolitics"); Hussain & Ptacek, supra note 10, at 497-98 (discussing
Agamben's conception of western political history). Also worth noting is that this part of Homo
Sacer consciously attempts to combine and extend the analysis of Arendt and Foucault. See
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 7, at 119-20. Working in the other direction, Mattias
Kumm provides a good argument for the claim that the developments Arendt describes, in
the context of liberal democracies, should not be described as "total," let alone "totalitarian."
See Kumm, supra note 188, at 365-69. Whether his argument is successful is a question well
beyond the scope of this Article. But note that the developments in constitutional criminal
procedure that I describe here-to the extent they overlap with the constitutional state Kumm
describes-indicate not only that one must take the bitter with the sweet in such a system, but
also that there is a lot of bitter to swallow.
222 But the authoritarian resonances of the Bush administration's executive power claims
are a legitimate subject of scholarly concern. See Levinson, supra note 205, at 705-06.
223 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
224 Id. at 30-31.
225 See id.
226 See id.
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"'[n]o right is held more sacred... than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' 2 7 But the Court then explained
that the idea of "clear and unquestionable authority of law" translates into a right "to
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion., 22' The move from a conception
of rights as near-absolutes and a need for clear legal authority to restrain liberty, to a
willingness to balance interests and to accept reasonable restraints, even if they are not
specifically authorized, occurs so quickly that it almost slips past unnoticed. Yet it
exemplifies the move from one view of rights and liberties to another, from a popular
conception of strong rights to a more diminished, "realistic" idea of what they mean
in practice.229
3. Reasonable Rights-Bearers
In the process of interpreting constitutional rights the Supreme Court has also de-
scribed how rights-bearing subjects should behave. In Florida v. Bostick, the Court
rejected a defendant's claim that he did not voluntarily "consent" to have his luggage
searched when police officers boarded a bus on which he was riding. 230 The Court
recognized that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus during the stop, but it noted
that this fact alone did not mean that he had been seized by the police-which would
have made his interaction with them nonconsensual as a matter of law.23' Rather,
"the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." 232 And, when Bostick argued
that his consent could not have been voluntary because no reasonable person in his
situation-someone carrying cocaine in his luggage-would consent to a search, the
Court responded that "the 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person.
' 233
In the post 9/11 case of United States v. Drayton23 4-another bus search case-the
Court elaborated on the characteristics of the reasonable innocent person. The Court
began by stressing the "cooperative" nature of the interaction between police and pas-
sengers: "There was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no over-
whelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat,
227 Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
228 id.
229 Here, one might analogize to acoustic separation between conduct rules and decision
rules. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984). Yet acoustic separation in this context is harder
edged, because it leads people to believe in a broad, rule-like conception of rights (the conduct
rule), while the actual doctrine (the decision rule) is less capacious and far more flexible.
230 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
231 Id. at 435-36.
232 Id. at 436.
233 Id. at 438 (emphasis omitted).
234 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice." '235 To be sure, the police officer
was armed and in uniform, but these facts would not alarm the normal citizen:
Officers are often required to wear uniforms and in many cir-
cumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort. Much the
same can be said for wearing sidearms. That most law enforcement
officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence
of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coercive-
ness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.
236
Justice Kennedy then instructed readers on the thought processes of reasonable, in-
nocent persons confronted by armed and uniformed police officers: "bus passengers
answer officers' questions and otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but be-
cause the passengers know that their participation enhances their own safety and the
safety of those around them.,
237
The final part of the opinion considered Drayton' s claim that he should have been
informed of his right not to consent to a search.238 The Court rejected the suggestion
that "police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking
permission to conduct a warrantless consent search"; rather the failure to provide this
information is just "'one factor to be taken into account. '"239 Justice Kennedy closed
with the following comments on citizenship, police conduct, and the rule of law:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and con-
sent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers
act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent.
It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of
his or her wishes [whether or not he or she actually knows what his
or her rights are, as the Court had just held] and for the police to act
in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place,
it dispels inferences of coercion.2'
Read with Bostick, this passage from Drayton confirms that the normal or desirable
rights-holder is the reasonable innocent person.24'
235 Id. at 204.
236 Id. at 204-05.
237 Id. at 205.
238 Id. at 206.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 207.
241 See id.
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Last Term's decision in Samson v. California,242 which held that parolees have
diminished expectations of privacy and may be subjected to suspicionless searches-
in part because they are simply more likely to violate the law24 3-- confirms the idea
that full rights are granted only to the reasonable innocent person. One might even
read the series of cases allowing the warrantless search or inspection of the homes
of people seeking welfare benefits as evidence that the reasonable person capable of
having full rights is not just innocent but also financially self-sufficient.2"
Further, Drayton indicates that the reasonable innocent person best asserts his
rights, whether or not he knows what they are, by refusing to invoke them and instead
cooperating with state authority. Indeed, to the extent state authority is represented
by the armed and uniformed police officer, the Drayton Court asserts that people are
likely to feel increasingly "assured" and "safe," with the implication that cooperation
and refusal to assert rights in these circumstances becomes more voluntary and more
consistent with good citizenship, not less.245 In sum, cases such as Drayton provide
doctrinal support for my suggestion that one of the important functions of rights in
a modem state is to manage one's subjugation to state power.'4
4. Extraterritoriality
The last Part of this analysis is the manner in which the Constitution applies to
conduct by U.S. officials outside the territory of the United States. The answer re-
mains uncertain after decades of litigation. In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court
held that inhabitants of territory that is under U.S. sovereignty but has not been "incor-
porated" into the United States are not entitled to the full panoply of constitutional
242 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
243 Id. at 2200. Probationers also have diminished expectations of privacy with respect to
warrantless searches. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); see also Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (holding prisoners have due process rights with respect to
prison regulations but making clear that their rights are easily overcome by state interests).
Although Samson signed a document that noted the possibility of suspicionless searches, the
Court expressly declined to find that he had consented to be searched. See Samson, 126 S.
Ct. at 2199 n.3.
244 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Sanchez v. San Diego County, 464 F.3d
916 (9th Cir. 2006).
245 By contrast, "scientific findings about the psychology of compliance and consent"
suggest that "the extent to which people feel free to refuse to comply is extremely limited
under situationally induced pressures." Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and
the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 153, 155.
246 This dynamic also occurs in the interpretation of constitutional provisions to permit pre-
ventive approaches to crime and other forms of undesirable behavior. See Chesney, Sleeper
Scenario, supra note 49, at 63-64; Eric S. Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual
Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576
(2004); Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REv. 121, 130
(2005); Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
771 (1998).
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rights, but only to those deemed "fundamental. 247 Exactly what that means, espe-
cially after the incorporation debate and the recent detention cases, remains unclear."
U.S. citizens have rights against the actions of U.S. officials on territory that is not
controlled by the United States,249 but there may be few constitutional constraints on
U.S. officials overseas when they act against people who are not citizens.25° In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution has little to say about the
manner in which foreign nationals residing overseas end up in the United States to
face criminal proceedings. Thus, the Court said in response to a defendant's claim
that he had been kidnapped by U.S. agents, "the court need not inquire as to how
respondent came before it."'"
Plainly, these geographic limits bear heavily on the Constitution's relation to a
criminal process that includes investigation, detention, interrogation, and possibly adju-
dication on a global scale. They also bear on the nature of rights in general. Note
particularly the apparent centrality of the border or citizenship to the reach of consti-
tutional constraints but not to the reach of federal power. To the extent borders are
critical, everything outside the U.S. is an exceptional space. The alien who has not
made it into the country, the ghost detainee held at an undisclosed overseas "black
site," and the resident of another country in which U.S. forces operate-all inhabit
a space that is in many respects without law from the U.S. perspective but in which
U.S. power remains present. That is, in most of the world as a matter of U.S. law,
enforceable rights may not exist, only bare life and state power. It is precisely this
247 E.g., DorT v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901).
248 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUrION,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CrrIZENsHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTrruTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). For post-Rasul dis-
cussions, see Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology
After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2073 (2005); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice,
73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501 (2005); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of
Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2017 (2005).
249 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
250 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement does not apply to actions by U.S. officials overseas against non-
citizens and suggesting the same is true for Fifth Amendment rights); Harbury v. Deutch, 233
F.3d 596,602--04 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying Verdugo to deny Fifth Amendment claim relating
to alleged torture under CIA auspices of non-citizen overseas), rev'd on other grounds, 536
U.S. 403 (2002); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250,276-79 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (suggesting
Rasul is in tension with Verdugo such that due process rights of aliens, particularly those with
a connection to the U.S., are "unresolved"); Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitu-
tional Confession Law-The IntemationalArena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions
Taken by U.S. Investigations from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851 (2003).
251 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992).
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condition that Agamben highlights and analyzes.252 Further, he warns that this space
of no-rights may be less a reassurance that rights exist somewhere else than it is a
harbinger of what might be a more general condition.253
There is an important caveat to the extraterritoriality issue. The Court's holding
in Hamdan that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to U.S. actions
against al Qaeda suggests that as a matter of enforceable federal law the government
is bound to respect international law rights that are roughly similar to those provided
in the Constitution when it acts extraterritorially. 2' Yet the extent to which those rights
are enforceable remains to be seen. Before the Military Commissions Act, government
officials could be prosecuted for violations of Common Article 3 under the War Crimes
Act.2 5' After the Military Commissions Act, prosecutions remain possible under the
new domestic law interpretation of Common Article 3, but not for all of the conduct
that would violate Common Article 3 as a matter of international law.256
Yet at the end of the day, prosecutorial discretion and public opinion make it un-
likely that there would be many prosecutions under either version of the War Crimes
Act. The most likely application of Common Article 3 has always been defensive,
by an alleged member of al Qaeda in proceedings brought by the government. The
Military Commissions Act prevents any use of the Geneva Conventions as a source
of rights in habeas or other "civil" proceedings, but it appears not to bar the use of
the Geneva Conventions in military commission or criminal court proceedings.257
The possible application of Common Article 3 hovers over the analysis in this
Article and raises the prospect of significant limitations on the new criminal process.
My prediction, however, is that even in the absence of the Military Commissions Act,
the Court would not apply Common Article 3 in a way that expands individual rights
beyond those in the Constitution 5 8 Put differently, Common Article 3 may eventually
252 See AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 7.
253 See id.
254 See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
256 See MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632-35 (2006).
257 See id. § 5, 120 Stat. at 2631-32. This provision also prohibits the use of Common Article
3 to obtain civil remedies, such as damages, in addition to habeas relief, or other forms of in-
junctive relief, even though the Hamdan majority never suggested the possibility of damages
for violations of Common Article 3. Of course, Hamdan did not provide any meaningful ex-
planation of exactly when and how Common Article 3 might operate as federal law. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2794, 2794 (2006); see also Carlos Manuel Vdizquez, The
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
258 Doing so arguably creates tension with more recent human rights treaties that overlap
with Common Article 3's articulation of humanitarian law. During ratification of the ICCPR,
for example, the administration and the Senate agreed that it was not self-executing and would
not change U.S. law. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. EXEC. DOC.
No. 102-23, at 4, 12 (1992); Resolution of Ratification, ICCPR, pt. I11(1), 138 CONG. REC.
S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728-35
(2004) (suggesting non-self-execution declarations bar federal courts from "interpreting and
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be applied in a way that is functionally equivalent to extraterritorial application of
the Constitution. Yet, even then, to the extent the Constitution creates space for the
new criminal process, Common Article 3 will not stand in the way.
B. The Scope of Specific Criminal Procedure Rights
This section considers some of the ways in which Fourth and Fifth Amendment
and due process doctrine have developed to make room for the new criminal process
in "ordinary" criminal cases. I want to stress that my aim is not to criticize these doc-
trines, most of which-whether or not I agree with them-are quite reasonable in at
least some senses of the word. My point is simply that the overall shape of criminal
procedure rights creates a significant amount of space for discretionary government
action that has tangible and often harmful impacts on what an earlier generation de-
scribed as life, liberty, and property.259
1. Search and Seizure
Justice Souter recently described the Court's overall approach to Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: "Courts attempting to strike a rea-
sonable Fourth Amendment balance... [will] credit the government's side with an
essential interest in readily administrable rules." 26° These words go beyond Justice
Scalia's concern in Anderson v. Creighton about finding "reasonable" accommodations
applying international human rights law" and prevent treaties from creating "obligations
enforceable in the federal courts"). Whether the MCA is itself a retrospective declaration that
the Geneva Conventions are not self-executing is a close question that goes beyond the scope
of this Article.
259 In addition to the doctrines discussed in the text, Eighth Amendment doctrine is also
relevant. Officials may harm inmates if force is "applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline," but they will be civilly liable if they act "maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). Officials are likely to receive a great
deal of latitude when order "reasonably" appears to be at stake. Still, the Eighth Amendment's
ban on "unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain in the course of incarceration or other
punishment seems clearly to outlaw gratuitous sadism. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-9
(1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); see Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)
(holding Eighth Amendment violated when inmate was handcuffed to a hitching post for
seven hours with his hands above his head as punishment for misbehavior on a work squad).
Hope notwithstanding, the trend of court decisions runs against prisoner claims, and federal
legislation has imposed significant procedural roadblocks. See Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378
(2006) (requiring prisoners to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing federal
claims, whether under § 1983 or in habeas); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1555 (2003).
260 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
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"between governmental need and individual freedom," 261' because here Justice Souter
admits that, for reasonableness to work in the interpretation of the right that limits
police authority to search and seize, courts must put a thumb on the government's
side of the scale when they craft doctrine.
262
To anyone who follows Fourth Amendment law, Justice Souter's statement is
remarkable only for its candor. Consider the following familiar doctrines. Warrants
may not issue without probable cause, which the Supreme Court has defined, in a self-
conscious departure from more restrictive possibilities, as a "practical, common-sense
decision" that turns on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is "a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found., 263 The deter-
mination "by resident judges and local law enforcement officers" that probable cause
exists is reviewed deferentially by courts. 264 When police do not have a warrant, they
can still conduct a search if they obtain the target's consent, and the target of the search
has no right to be informed of her right to refuse consent.265 The predictable result
is that a significant percentage of searches are consent searches, in large part because
suspects feel that they cannot refuse their consent when a law enforcement official
asks for it.2
66
Police also do not need a warrant if they have probable cause and an exception
to the warrant requirement applies, such as exigent circumstances, plain view, or
automobile searches. 267 Although case-law has resisted expanding the exigent circum-
stances exception very far,26 the kinds of pressures created by a war on terror will
put new strains on it.269 For its part, the reasonableness-based stop-and-frisk doctrine
of Terry v. Ohio270 has expanded considerably. The Court now speaks, for example,
of "a police officer's prerogative, in accord with Terry, to conduct a protective search
of a person who has already been legitimately stopped., 271 In addition to the Terry
doctrine, investigators may conduct some kind of search based on a showing of
261 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
262 See id. at 644-45.
263 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983). The Gates Court rejected the "two-pronged
test" of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
264 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
265 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33 (1996).
21 See Nadler, supra note 245.
267 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (comparing search requirements
for containers and automobiles); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (illustrating plain
view); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (providing limits to exigency).
268 Compare Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 12, 14 (1999) (per curiam) ("process[ing]
the crime scene" for 16 hours not justified by exigent circumstances), with Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (upholding search of home entered by fleeing suspect).
269 See Colorado v. Higbee, 802 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1990) (upholding warrantless search for
a bomb as proper application of exigent circumstances exception).
270 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
271 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000).
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reasonableness when they have "special needs. 272 Indeed, the discretion and balanc-
ing, not to mention the preventive focus, that characterize the special needs doctrine
make it a central part of the new criminal process. The Second Circuit's recent, brief,
and unanimous decision that special needs support suspicionless container searches
of subway passengers in New York City indicates how easily war on terror concerns
mesh with existing reasonableness and balancing methodologies and also demonstrates
how normal, even central, the special needs doctrine has become.273
Officers seeking to execute a warrant "must announce their presence and provide
residents an opportunity to open the door.' 274 They must wait a "reasonable" amount
of time before using force to gain entry, but the idea of exigent circumstances also
applies to create an exception when police have "a reasonable suspicion that knocking
and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be danger-
ous, or futile, or... would... allow[] the destruction of evidence., 275 And, last Term,
the Court held that the Constitution does not require an effective remedy for violations
of the knock-and-announce rule.276
Importantly, police may use force on people as well as property when they exe-
cute a warrant. This power includes a "categorical" authority to detain people on the
premises for the duration of the search, and the power to detain includes the ability to
restrain with handcuffs or other "reasonable" force where the situation is "inherently
dangerous." '277 The categorical power to detain, in turn, licenses increasing state vio-
lence. In the words of Justice Stevens, in inherently dangerous situations "it may
well be appropriate to use both overwhelming force and surprise in order to secure
the premises as promptly as possible. '278 While the analogy may seem tendentious,
Justice Stevens's words bring to mind the military's "shock and awe" approach to
the war in Iraq.279 At least rhetorically, then, Hardt and Negri may be correct that
272 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979), provides the analytical structure for the
special needs exception that has been applied in complex-or perhaps simply inconsistent-
ways in cases such as Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), City ofIndianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
273 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
274 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
275 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,394 (1997). When the knock-and-announce rule ap-
plies, a wait of only fifteen to twenty seconds is reasonable when police are searching for drugs
that can be disposed of relatively easily. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38 (2003).
276 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159; see supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
277 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-100 (2005). Police also have authority to detain
residents outside their home while waiting for approval of a warrant application. See Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
278 Muehler, 544 U.S. at 108 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
279 See Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage, CBSNEws, Jan. 24, 2003, http://www
.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/evening news/main537928.shtml (describing initial attacks
on Iraq as a "shock and awe" strategy). The shock and awe approach is described in the National
Defense University Press book by HARLAN K. ULLMAN & JAMES P. WADE, SHOCK AND AWE:
ACHIEVING RAPID DOMINANCE (1996), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS2902 1.
[Vol. 15:765
TERRORISM AND THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS
military and police activity are converging.280 Of course, it is the argument of this
Article that doctrine does not lag too far behind the rhetoric.
The use of force, even overwhelming force, is thus part of the baseline police con-
duct that the Fourth Amendment permits. What is forbidden is the use of excessive
force in the context of searches and seizures, which include arrests. The distinction
between permitted force and excessive force turns on reasonableness, 28' a doctrine that
serves-as I just suggested-as both a limitation and a delegation of power. Further,
the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts that application of this standard turns
not just on the reasonableness of the force itself, but also on the reasonableness of an
official' s belief about the need to use force.282 In theory, then, the Fourth Amendment
bars unreasonable force, but in practice, officials are likely to receive a great deal of
latitude regarding their decisions on how much force to use because reasonable
mistakes about whether to use force and how much force to use do not violate the
Constitution. For an example of what this means on the ground, a police officer's
belief that he must use deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspect-which the
Supreme Court has permitted where there is "probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others" 283 -will receive little second-guessing from courts. 28' This relatively defer-
ential review weakens the Fourth Amendment's power to deter officers considering
whether to use deadly force.
2. Interrogation
The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause at first seems like a good candi-
date to restrain the new criminal process, 285 but as with the Fourth Amendment the
story is more complicated. Today, self-incrimination issues relating to the admission
at trial of allegedly coerced statements usually fall under the doctrine of Miranda
v. Arizona, which holds that before interrogating a suspect, police must inform him
of his rights to remain silent and have the assistance of counsel, and that the exclu-
sionary rule will apply to statements obtained in violation of this doctrine.286 Yet the
280 See HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 3.
281 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
282 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) ("If an officer reasonably, but mis-
takenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back.... the officer would be justified in
using more force than in fact was needed.").
283 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,3 (1985). For a more recent application of the Garner
rule, see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam).
284 Indeed, because the Gamer rule turns on probable cause, courts reviewing claims about
the use of deadly force presumably must "give due weight to inferences drawn ... by...
local law enforcement officers." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
28 One of its original purposes was to prevent torture. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar
Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625,
2651 (1996).
286 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Court also held that suspects can waive the right to remain silent, even though waiver
takes place in the same atmosphere of psychological coercion that characterizes police
interrogation generally.287 And, in fact, one study found that only 22% of suspects
take advantage of their Miranda rights; the remaining 78% waive their rights.288
Commentators tend to agree that the combination of recognizing inherent psycho-
logical coercion while also allowing waivers creates tension in the doctrine.28 9 In my
view, this tension largely dissipates if we read Miranda more modestly, as a case that
backed away from the implications of Escobedo v. Illinois290 to hold that inherently
coercive police interrogation is permissible.29' The goal of Miranda, in other words,
was to dispel only some of the psychological coercion inherent in custodial interro-
gation,292 thus leaving open the possibility that the remaining coercion may be desir-
able.293 Whether or not Chief Justice Warren meant to insulate a baseline amount
of coercion when he wrote the majority opinion, later cases that make exceptions to
Miranda seem to adopt this reading.294 Contemporary interrogators have also, in Welsh
White's phrase, "adapted to Miranda" by developing permissible methods for obtain-
ing waivers of the right to remain silent.295 While not physically violent, these methods
are often extremely coercive in the ways in which they deceive suspects and manipu-
late their fear, uncertainty, and deference to authority.296
287 Id. at 444, 475.
288 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
653-54 (1996).
289 See Tracey Maclin, A Criminal Procedure Regime Based on Instrumental Values, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 197, 221 & n.44 (2005) (reviewing DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT
AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2003)).
290 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
291 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
292 See id. at 467,469-70 (stating the goal of the warnings is to "combat" coercion but that
warnings cannot dispel the coercion inherent in interrogation).
293 John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights
Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REv. 733, 812-13 (2005) [hereinafter Parry,
Constitutional Interpretation].
294 For a summary of the exceptions, see WAYNE R. LAFAE Er AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 9.5-.6 (4th ed. 2004). In addition, persistent uncertainty about the constitutional status of
Miranda undercuts any effort to treat it as a robust doctrine. Recent cases declare both that
it is prophylactic and that it cannot be overruled by Congress-hardly a stable view. For dis-
cussion of these issues, see Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 293, at 781-97.
295 WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRAC-
TICES AFTER DICKERSON 76 (2001).
296 White gives the example of a man suspected of sexually abusing his daughter. Id. at
88. The suspect was told that he had "a problem" and was "not normal," but neither was he
"a very dangerous person," nor a criminal who's going to frighten people." Id. Rather, he
was informed that he needed "help" for his own and his family's sake and that police could
help him obtain it. Id. After an officer conducted a similar interrogation of Frank Miller, "he
collapsed in a state of shock. He slid off his chair and onto the floor with a blank stare on his
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Admissibility of statements in criminal trials is also governed by the due process
voluntariness test, which the Court developed in the years before it held that the self-
incrimination clause applied to the states and before Miranda transformed self-incrimi-
nation doctrine.297 A confession is involuntary in violation of due process if, under
the totality of the circumstances, "'a defendant's will was overborne' by the circum-
stances surrounding the giving of a confession., 298 Although this standard seems de-
finitive, the due process test in fact has little traction. Not only is the voluntariness
test famously difficult to apply, but few courts will find a confession to be involuntary
in violation of due process if the suspect received the Miranda warnings, waived them,
and thus apparently spoke free of Fifth Amendment compulsion.299
Going beyond admissibility, some cases from the mid-twentieth century suggest
that due process or the privilege against self-incrimination could provide substantive
protection against coercive interrogation regardless of whether the government ever
seeks to use that information. 300 More recently, however, four justices stated clearly in
Chavez v. Martinez that the privilege against self-incrimination is only a trial right.301
It applies only to efforts to introduce coerced testimony in a legal proceeding, has no
other relevance to conduct outside the court, and will not support a claim for dam-
ages.3" 2 Concurring on this issue, Justices Souter and Breyer agreed that the plaintiff
could not seek damages, but they were not willing to go as far as the plurality.3"3 For
them, the privilege would almost never apply outside the courtroom, but they did not
dismiss the possibility that it might apply in extreme cases in which plaintiffs made
face. The police officers sent for a first aid squad that took him to the hospital." Miller v. Fenton,
796 F.2d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 1986). The court rejected Miller's claim that the confessions had
been obtained by coercion. Id. at 600.
297 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
298 Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
299 For difficulties applying the test, see WHITE, supra note 295, at 39-48. For the test's
functional overlap with Miranda, see id. at 120-22 and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,
608-09 (2004).
31 In Brown v. Mississippi, a deputy sheriff whipped three suspects until they confessed.
The court reversed the resulting convictions, stating that "[it would be difficult to conceive
of methods more revolting to the sense ofjustice than those taken to procure the confessions."
297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, Justice Jackson dissented from reversal
of a conviction based on a confession obtained after thirty-six hours of near continuous
interrogation, but he took care to assert that "[i]nterrogation per se is not, while violence per
se is, an outlaw." 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In Chambers v. Florida,
law enforcement officials obtained confessions from a group of tenant farmers after a five
day interrogation that likely involved physical coercion. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). The Court's
opinion indicated that torture and related practices violate the Constitution, whether or not
the government ever seeks to introduce the resulting confession. Id. The Court also rejected
the claim that the interrogation was justified as an effort to solve a particularly heinous
crime. Id.
301 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003) (plurality opinion).
302 id.
303 Id. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
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"powerful showing[s].' ' '3°4 Presumably they had something like torture in mind,
but given the facts of Chavez-in which a severely wounded man who believed he
might be dying was interrogated relentlessly in a hospital emergency room by police
who sought to take advantage of his pain and fear3° 5-their definition of torture is not
expansive. Similarly, given these facts, their idea of conduct that would provide a
"powerful showing" does not include what international law and recent statutes
describe as "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment., 306 By contrast, Justice Stevens
considered the conduct in Chavez to be "the functional equivalent of an attempt to
obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous methods," although
he did not say that damages should be available for violation of the privilege.30 7
Interrogation issues thus are litigated along two tracks. When the government
attempts to introduce allegedly coerced testimony at trial, the self incrimination and
due process clauses will apply. When a person seeks damages for an allegedly coer-
cive interrogation, courts will apply Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process doctrine, which in turn has two prongs. First, conduct that "shocks the con-
science" violates the Constitution.3 8 This test suggests the possibility of imposing
meaningful-if vague-restraints on state violence and the new criminal process. But
the Court declared in County of Sacramento v. Lewis that conduct does not shock the
conscience unless it is "unjustifiable by any government interest. '' 309 Three justices
applied this doctrine in a very straightforward way in Chavez: "the need to investi-
gate whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable government
interest [allowing interrogation of Martinez] given the risk that key evidence would
have been lost if Martinez had died without the authorities ever hearing his side of the
story."31 Only three of the remaining six justices were willing to disagree publicly
with that conclusion.3 '
If "any government interest" will justify otherwise conscience-shocking behavior,
then this doctrine does not stand for much more than the proposition that the state
31 Id. at 778 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
305 Id. at 764 (plurality opinion).
31 See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Detainee Treatment Act,
the Military Commissions Act, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights).
307 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 783 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens may agree with the Chavez plurality that the Fifth-Amendment privilege is only a
trial right and will not support a damages claim. See Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 293, at 752 n.108, 773 n.230.
308 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
309 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
310 538 U.S. at 775 (opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.).
3 Id. at 787-88 & n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 796-99
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg joined the relevant
portions of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 799 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
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must have a purpose when it harms people; it cannot do so arbitrarily. The recent dis-
trict court decision in Arar v. Ashcroft, concerning U.S. involvement in rendition and
torture, suggestsjust such a possibility.312 Under the "any interest" language, individual
claimants can win (and have rights) only if they prove that their interests outweigh
those of the government. And all of this simply reflects Justice Scalia's statement in
Anderson and Justice Souter's in Atwater.313 In the new criminal process, rights are not
trumps; they are merely the outcome of balancing tests between government and indi-
vidual interests in which courts place a thumb on the government's side of the scale.
The second way that conduct can offend substantive due process principles is
by violating a fundamental right.314 Although this doctrine likely provides stronger
protection than the shocks-the-conscience test, it still makes room for exceptions.
Conduct narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest is constitutional even
if it violates fundamental rights. 3 5 Add to that the sometimes-enforced requirement
that the claimed right be described with particularity, and the doctrine becomes con-
ceptually malleable enough to allow at least some coercive or violent actions in the
service of gathering information, especially under the compelling circumstances that
many believe are presented by the war on terror. 6
312 The court's analysis bears out the logical potential of substantive due process doctrine:
While one cannot ignore the "shocks the conscience" test established
in Rochin v. California, that case involved the question whether tor-
ture could be used to extract evidence for the purpose of prosecuting
criminal conduct, a very different question from the one ultimately pres-
ented here, to wit, whether substantive due process would erect a per
se bar to coercive investigations, including torture, for the purpose of
preventing a terrorist attack.... [W]hether torture always violates the
Fifth Amendment... remains unresolved from a doctrinal standpoint.
414 F. Supp. 2d 250,274 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citation omitted). For discussion ofArar,
compare Julian Ku, Why Constitutional Rights Litigation Should Not Follow the Flag, A.B.A.
NAT'L SECURITY L. REP., July 2006, at 1, with Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies:
The Newfound National Security Exception to Bivens, A.B.A. NAT'L SECURITY L. REP., July
2006, at 1. For a thorough discussion of Arar's interaction with Canadian and U.S. officials,
and the treatment he received after being removed by U.S. officials to Syria, see COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR,
REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2006), available at http://www.ararcomission.ca.
313 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
314 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
315 Id.
316 Cf. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 761-75 (opinion of Thomas, J.). It is not completely clear
whether the shocks-the-conscience and fundamental rights approaches provide alternative
footholds for damages claims. Justice Thomas treated them as distinct tests for this purpose
in Chavez, and no other justice specifically disagreed with that view. Yet a majority of the
Court suggested in Lewis that the fundamental rights approach applies only to legislative
action, while executive action is judged solely under the shocks-the-conscience test. See County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-47 & n.8 (1998).
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To close out this section and gesture toward the one that follows, consider the
following statement by Justice Scalia for a majority of the Court last term in Hudson
v. Michigan:
Assuming ... that civil suit is not an effective deterrent, one can
think of many forms of police misconduct that are similarly "un-
deterred." When, for example, a confessed suspect in the killing of
a police officer, arrested (along with incriminating evidence) in a
lawful warranted search, is subjected to physical abuse at the station
house, would it seriously be suggested that the evidence must be
excluded, since that is the only "effective deterrent"? 3
17
Justice Scalia's point is that the exclusionary rule should apply only when it can deter
police misconduct.318 Yet he also admits that some police misconduct may go un-
deterred,319 which raises serious questions about the scope of constitutional rights
to be free of such misconduct. Along the way, Justice Scalia-again, speaking for a
majority of the Court-seems also to have rejected the idea, applied in the widely
cited, but rarely followed, case of United States v. Toscanino, that outrageous govern-
ment conduct might support dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds.32°
At the end of the day, the new criminal process blurs the space between police and
military action, and between due process and less refined methods. Yet that blurring
sometimes goes in only one direction. While the new criminal process has achieved
ample room in the criminal courtroom, at times it also restricts the space in which
constitutional rights operate to the courtroom alone.
C. Rights, Remedies, and the New Criminal Process
Constitutional analysis of the new criminal process is not complete until we
examine the remedies available for claimed violations of criminal procedure rights.
317 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166-67 (2006).
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring dismissal of indictment if defendant proved he
was abducted and tortured by agents of the United States). Contra United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to dismiss indictment of defendant who
was kidnapped and claimed he was tortured by federal agents); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman,
896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding government torture will not support dismissal of an
indictment); Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 693, 786 & n.358 (1995) (citing Toscanino as an
example of a decision "repeatedly distinguished, even in the circuit of origin"). Less clear
is whether there was much left of Toscanino to reject after United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655 (1992). See also United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2002)
(concluding there is not much left to reject).
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The primary remedy for misconduct in criminal investigations is the exclusionary
rule. Despite continued criticism by the Supreme Court, most recently in Hudson,
the rule continues to be applied to most violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments that are litigated in the course of a criminal case.32' But the exclusionary rule
has an important limitation. By its terms, it only applies when the government seeks
to introduce evidence in a state or federal judicial proceeding. It has no application
to conduct outside the courtroom-however abusive that conduct may be-unless
and until the government seeks to introduce the resulting evidence. This limit is im-
portant to the new criminal process because investigations may be less closely linked
to seeking evidence for a criminal trial. As a consequence, application of constitu-
tional doctrine to the investigative aspects of the new criminal process may require
other remedies. To the extent those remedies fall short, the new process will operate
with few legal constraints.
The most obvious alternate remedy for the violence that is often part of the new
criminal process is criminal prosecution of the officials responsible for the conduct.
But bringing a criminal prosecution requires police and prosecutors to exercise their
discretion to collect evidence and seek charges-perhaps subject to pressure from their
political superiors. Even when they do bring charges, prosecutors may seek a plea
bargain in such cases, so that officials will not be held completely responsible for their
actions. Other actors in the criminal justice system also play a role in the general
failure of prosecution. Grand juries are often reluctant to indict police officers who
testify that they were trying to do their job, and judges and petit juries are reluctant
to convict in all but the most egregious cases. And, where officials can provide an ex-
planation for the conduct for which they are being prosecuted, they likely will be able
to raise reasonableness, self-defense, or necessity, either as formal defenses or infor-
mally as arguments against indictment to the grand jury and against conviction to
the petit jury. Successful prosecutions do happen, but they are relatively rare and
the number of prosecutions is small.322
Another problem with prosecutions is that they fail to prevent harm, both because
they can only react to past events and because the paucity of prosecutions dilutes their
deterrent value.323 A better remedy is to craft rules that restrain official conduct in
advance. One way to accomplish that goal is through legislation and administrative
321 See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-67 (summarizing criticisms of and restrictions on the
exclusionary rule); see also id. at 2170 (Kennedy J., concurring) ("[Tihe continued operation
of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt."); Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2680-81 (2006) (also taking a restrictive view of the
exclusionary rule).
322 See Sifton, supra note 15, at 489-90 (finding that few prosecutions have been brought
in response to documented abuses of people detained in counter-terror operations).
323 Note here, of course, that I have partially embraced a preventive rationale after suggesting
that such rationales should be viewed critically. See supra note 246. Yet there is some differ-
ence, I think, between attempts to prevent or constrain state power and violence, and efforts
to harness state power with the goal of managing people's lives to prevent undesirable acts.
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regulations, which have had limited success, in part because they are likely to legiti-
mate the new criminal process even as they regulate it.324
A second way to restrain official conduct in advance is through civil suits for
injunctions against officials who violate constitutional rights.325 But in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme Court held that to seek injunctions in federal court
against official conduct, individual plaintiffs must demonstrate their "standing" to
do so, which translates into proof that they are suffering a continuing injury or face
a definite, imminent, and personal threat of future injury.326 The rationale for impos-
ing this requirement is that, without standing, anyone could sue to restrain govern-
ment action, and such suits would inappropriately take the place of political action.327
With respect to people who have been harmed and who may seek damages for their
injuries, the Court declared that without a continuing injury or credible fear of future
harm, they are "no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen."32 Whether
or not these reasons are persuasive, the impact of Lyons is clear. Most commentators
agree that the decision "makes it virtually impossible for the victim of police abuse
to secure injunctive relief against a local government entity for practices of its police
or sheriffs department." '329 The same result holds for injunction claims against fed-
eral officials.330
The remaining judicial remedy is a civil suit for damages against state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or against federal officials under the Bivens doctrine.33' Dam-
ages claims raise a host of problems of their own. First is the possibility that, in the
context of a suit involving torture or related mistreatment by federal officials, national
security concerns would lead to dismissal of the suit-a defense which has, in fact,
succeeded in at least two recent cases.332 Second, claims against individuals confront
324 The discussion of legislative actions in Part I.B., supra, provides a good example.
325 The federal government has statutory authority to seek injunctions against patterns or
practices of law enforcement conduct that violate civil rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000),
but as with criminal prosecution, this power depends on the energy, resources, and commit-
ment of executive branch officials, and the statute has been invoked infrequently since its
enactment. Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra note 198, at 75.
326 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
327 Id. at 111-13.
328 Id. at 111.
329 HARoLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE
473 (2d ed. 2004); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review:
A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 427, 501 n.172 (1997)
(Lyons is "an almost insurmountable barrier"). On application of Lyons to class actions,
compare Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (denying standing), and Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 370-77 (1976) (same), with County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
51-52 (1991) (allowing standing). Nor does the presence alone of a challenged practice in
a statute or written policy suffice to show standing. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 210-12 (1995).
330 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-50.
331 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
332 See El-Masri v. United States, No. 06-1667, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4796 (4th Cir.
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doctrines of absolute or qualified immunity. Absolute immunity, which applies pri-
marily to judges, legislators, and prosecutors while they are performing those roles,
prevents any suit for damages, no matter how egregious the conduct.33 3 Qualified
immunity requires a court to dismiss the claim even if it concludes that a defendant's
conduct violated the Constitution, if, at the time the defendant acted, the conduct did
not "'violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.""" That is to say, recovery is available only for violations
of "clearly established" rights, and a right is not clearly established with respect to a
specific claim unless "' [the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reason-
able official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.... [I]n the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."' 335
For a damages claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment, a court applying
the qualified immunity standard would ask whether an official reasonably believed
that his actions amounted to a reasonable use of force under the circumstances, which
includes the potential threat posed by the victim/plaintiff.36 For a substantive due
process claim, the court would likely ask whether the official reasonably could have
believed that his actions were serving "'any government interest." 337 In neither case
will it be easy simply to say that the conduct was not only unlawful, but also that the
unlawfulness was "apparent.,
338
Moving beyond these roadblocks, even in successful cases, damages are often an
incomplete remedy. The Supreme Court has said that the primary purpose of damages
in such cases is to compensate, not to deter.339 The resulting possibility, that damages
Mar. 2, 2007) (affirming use of state secrets privilege to dismiss a Bivens claim); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281-83, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding national security
concerns are "special factors counseling hesitation" supporting dismissal of a Bivens claim,
and not deciding whether dismissal was also required under the state secrets privilege).
333 Compare Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (acting as a judge when signing
sterilization order), with Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 1996) (not acting as a judge
when sexually assaulting people in judicial chambers).
331 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
331 Id. at 615 (first alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
640 (1987)).
336 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
337 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,775 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)).
338 But see Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. CV:05-093-S-EJL, 2006 WL 2682346 (D. Idaho
Sept. 27, 2006) (rejecting a qualified immunity claim brought in a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion in a case seeking damages for allegedly unlawful arrest and detention during a terror-
ism investigation).
331 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978). For discussion of additional issues
relating to damages and deterrence, see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 345,372 (2000). For
discussion of inadequate documentation of litigation against police officers, which in turn
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awards will be inadequate to deter constitutional violations, only highlights the ex post
nature of the remedy. As with prosecutions, damages do not prevent harm. Indeed,
one could argue that damages liability merely establishes the non-prohibitive cost
of particular kinds of government action.
D. The Scope of Executive and Legislative Authority to Shape the New
Criminal Process
Hamdan determined that the President cannot establish the new criminal process
in the teeth of contrary legislation.3 ° It also indicates that the Court will interpret
existing legislation generously to check what it determines to be executive overreach-
ing.341 How far the President may go in the absence of legislation remains unclear.
In the words of Justice Jackson, "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories
of law. '342 To the extent the President has unilateral power to accelerate the new crim-
inal process as part of the war on terror, it should be seen as an emergency power that
applies only in exceptional circumstances ("the imperatives of events") and dissipates
as the emergency abates. 43 Although I would not press the claim too strenuously,
President Bush's authorization of indefinite detentions and his order creating military
tribunals were arguably justified on emergency grounds at the time they were issued.
Even if that were true, however, any emergency has long since passed, so that mili-
tary commissions and indefinite detentions can currently be justified only by an act
of Congress-and, of course, the Court dodged the emergency power question and
found sufficient statutory authorization in Hamdi and Hamdan.344
The critical point to remember, however, is that the new criminal process extends
beyond the doctrines that are emerging specifically to deal with the war on terror.
The evolution of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine suggests that courts will
defer to more ordinary efforts to expand the authority and discretion of law enforce-
ment officials and prosecutors. A different way of making this point is to say that
one never sees Youngstown applied to questions of "ordinary" law enforcement and
impedes meaningful analysis of the impact of § 1983 cases, see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BuFF. L. REv.
757 (2004).
3 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2757 (2006).
141 See id. at 2786.
342 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
343 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); infra notes 373-82 and accompanying text (discussing emergency power).
344 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-74; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion). For good
discussions of these issues, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 167, at 252-53; Neal K.
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals,
111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1292-95 (2002).
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prosecutorial power. Also important, and discussed in the next section, is the nature
of emergency power itself. Specifically, a doctrine that the President's unilateral
authority is confined to emergency situations will be small comfort if we live in a
state of permanent emergency.
For its part, Congress has authority to limit the new criminal process through
legislation. With the ambiguous exception of the Detainee Treatment Act and the
even weaker exceptions of the Military Commissions Act and USA PATRIOT ACT
reauthorization, Congress has not done so. Instead it has sometimes acquiesced in
executive decisions and sometimes passed statutes that codify or expand the new crim-
inal process.345 Congress's general willingness to date to authorize executive power
means that the critical question is whether there are any constraints on the ability of
Congress and the President, acting together, to expand the new criminal process. The
previous sections have suggested that although the Supreme Court will review and
sometimes reject these efforts, it will not put serious roadblocks in the path of the new
criminal process. The decision to mold constitutional doctrine-including criminal
procedure doctrine--to accommodate the shifting and expanding needs of the modem
regulatory state was made long ago.
On the specific issues of detention and military commissions, Hamdi and
Hamdan suggest a significant degree of deference to legislative solutions.3' 6 Here,
we are squarely in Justice Jackson's first category of separation of powers analysis,
in which executive action pursuant to congressional authorization will be upheld
unless the federal government as a whole does not have the power to act."7 Under
that framework, Congress almost certainly has the power, for example, to take what
could be terrorism prosecutions within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts and put them before military commissions, subject to whatever constitutional
requirements will apply to their specific procedures. Courts-martial are an established
example of just this kind of structure. 4 The statutory links between courts-martial
and military commissions and the Court's stress on those links in Hamdan' 9 make
the validity of similar treatment for military commissions almost certain.
The caveat to this analysis is a probable requirement for some ultimate federal
court review.35° Ordinarily, a habeas corpus petition in federal court would be the
... For discussion of congressional action in the war on terror, see supra Part I.B.
346 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-76.
347 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
34' See N. Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 66 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
349 See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006); Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788-93.
30 See Commodity Futures Trade Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (articulating
multi-factor test that includes asking whether "the 'essential attributes ofjudicial power' are
reserved to Article III courts"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REV. 915, 917-18 (1988) (suggesting non-Article
III courts are generally permissible if some federal court review is available). I make few dis-
tinctions in this part of my analysis between citizens and aliens. I assume, post-Rasul, that at
20071 823
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
obvious and probably sufficient method for such review. But the Detainee Treatment
Act and Military Commissions Act cut off habeas corpus and other ordinary federal
court remedies for aliens who have been found by CSRTs to be "illegal enemy com-
batants" or who have been convicted by military commissions.35" ' These legislative
decisions raise the specter of the suspension clause.352 Still, even if aliens have a right
to habeas review, "the substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate
nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus. 353 Both statutes replace habeas with exclusive
review in the D.C. Circuit and the possibility of review by the Supreme Court.354
The critical inquiry thus reduces to whether the limited scope of that review is "neither
inadequate nor ineffective"3 55 for purposes of the suspension clause and whether the
"essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article Il courts" '356 for pur-
poses of the relationship between Article I and Article In courts.
The Detainee Treatment Act, as amended and reinforced by the Military Com-
missions Act, allows review by the D.C. Circuit on two issues. For review of CSRT
decisions, the court may ask:
least some aliens held in U.S. custody overseas have some right to habeas review that is pro-
tected by the suspension clause and that aliens held in the U.S. likely have a greater right to
habeas review. Whether that is in fact the proper doctrine goes beyond the scope of this Article.
In Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062,2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2007),
the D.C. Circuit said no such right exists, but the Supreme Court probably will have to decide
this issue in the near future. Further, even if the suspension clause applies, one still must
determine what claims may be brought, an issue that implicates the complex and ambiguous
doctrines of extraterritoriality. See Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 263, 295-98 (2004); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 344, at 1303-04; supra notes
247-58 and accompanying text. Although the question of what claims are available to aliens
is also beyond the scope of this Article, it should be clear that one of my larger points is that
the law governing any available claim will reflect the concerns of the new criminal process.
311 MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 7, 9, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-37 (2006); DTA, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42.
352 See Boumediene, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 (holding aliens detained outside the U.S.
have no constitutional right to habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152
(D.D.C. 2006) (holding the MCA unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus,
but that an alien detained outside the U.S. has no constitutional right to invoke the common
law writ of habeas), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005),
rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). For a good and concise overview of the suspension clause and
the issues it raises, see David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another
View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 59 (2006).
13 Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
114 MCA, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2622 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 950g (2006));
DTA, § 1005(e)(3), 119 Stat. at 2743; Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2819 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Government does not dispute that the DTA leaves unaffected our certiorari
jurisdiction.., to review the D.C. Circuit's decisions.").
... Swain, 430 U.S. at 381.
356 Commodity Futures Trade Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
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(i) whether the status determination of the [CSRT] ...was
consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the
Secretary of Defense for [CSRTs] (including the requirement that the
conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence); and
(ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to
make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States.357
For review of military commission decisions, the questions are similar. As amended
by the Military Commissions Act, the Detainee Treatment Act provides:
(i) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards
and procedures specified for a military commission.. .; and
(ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to
reach the final decision is consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States. 8
In his Hamdan dissent, Justice Scalia contended that this language satisfies any sus-
pension clause concern because it allows review of "every aspect of the military com-
missions, including the fact of their existence and every respect in which they differ
3" DTA, § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 2742. The MCA provides that this review is available
to all aliens detained by the United States for whom a CSRT has been conducted, not just for
aliens detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay. MCA, § 10, 120 Stat. at
2637.
358 DTA, § 1005(e)(3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2743, as amended by MCA, § 9(4), 120 Stat. at
2637. The Military Commissions Act also enacted a separate provision on the scope of D.C.
Circuit review. 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c) (2006) ("(1) whether the final decision was consistent
with the standards and procedures specified in this chapter; and (2) to the extent applicable,
the Constitution and the laws of the United States."); MCA, § 3, 120 Stat. at 2622. To the
extent this provision-particularly subsection 2-has a different meaning from the amended
language of the DTA, it appears broader and more in line with Justice Scalia's interpretation
of the DTA language in his Hamdan dissent, as discussed in the text. See infra text
accompanying note 359. Note that the DTA had provided that D.C. Circuit review of military
commissions was discretionary in some cases, see DTA, § 1005(e)(3)(B), 119 Stat. at 2743,
but the MCA provided that review is as of right in all cases, see MCA, § 9(2), 120 Stat. at
2636-37. The deleted provision of discretionary review likely was unconstitutional for aliens
held in the U.S. Whether it was unconstitutional for aliens held overseas is less clear. Finally,
the MCA also changed the review process between the trial and the D.C. Circuit to provide
for review of legal issues only by a new Court of Military Commission Review composed
of military judges. See 10 U.S.C. § 950(f) (2006).
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from courts-martial., 359 By contrast, Justice Kennedy's Hamdan concurrence derided
the pre-MCA review provisions for military commissions as compared to the review
provisions of the UCMJ, and Judge Rogers recently asserted that the Military Com-
missions Act's review procedures fail to provide an adequate substitute for habeas
with respect to CSRTs.36"
If these review provisions are adequate and effective for purposes of the sus-
pension clause-and issue that plainly remains in doubt-they are also likely to
preserve the essential attributes of Article III power. The same analysis might hold
for review of detention decisions as well, although the fact that a CSRT is far more
of a summary proceeding than trial before a military commission weighs heavily
against an automatic equation of the two for purposes of evaluating the adequacy of
D.C. Circuit review.
Two important caveats. First, the statutes provide no review for people detained
without either a CSRT hearing or a military commission trial. To the extent this cate-
gory includes people present in the United States, the argument for its validity seems
elusive at best."' Second, by barring conditions of confinement claims, the Military
Commissions Act may also bar claims about transfer or rendition of prisoners to other
countries, which again raises due process and related concerns in at least some cases.
The law of international extradition may provide a useful analogy for the review
analysis. The person facing extradition is usually arrested and held in federal custody
pending a hearing at which a federal judge or magistrate determines whether probable
cause exists.36' The procedure is more formal than a CSRT but significantly less ex-
tensive than trial before a military commission. There is no appeal from the result of
the hearing; instead, if the person is found extraditable, the case goes to the Secretary
of State for review and decision.363 Federal courts tend to characterize the extradition
hearing as an Article I proceeding, not an Article 111 case.364 The extraditee may seek
habeas relief in federal court, which goes some way toward satisfying concerns about
vesting decisions about individual liberty in Article I tribunals. Critically, however,
... Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2818-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
'60 See id. at 2807 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 3682, at *66-74 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
361 Whether it is unconstitutional for aliens held overseas is less clear. Plainly the internal-
overseas distinctions is fodder for the new criminal process, as I explore to some extent in the
discussion of extradition in the text.
362 For discussion of the probable cause standard at both the arrest stage and the hearing
stage of international extradition, as well as an argument that probable cause to arrest should
be less formal than in domestic cases, see Roberto Iraola, Foreign Extradition, Provisional
Arrest Warrants, and Probable Cause, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347 (2006).
363 For a summary of this process and analysis of the no-appeal rule, see John T. Parry,
No Appeal: The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty's Effort to Create Federal
Jurisdiction, 25 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 546-50 (2003).
31 Id. at 549. This conclusion derives from Judge Friendly's concern that the presence of
executive review would make the extradition hearing unconstitutional if it were an Article
III proceeding. Parry, Lost History, supra note 59, at 160-65.
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the traditional scope of habeas review is narrow in extradition cases: "habeas corpus
is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the of-
fence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there
was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe
the accused guilty.
365
If Justice Scalia' s interpretation of the Detainee Treatment Act is correct,366 then
federal court review of military commission decisions is at least as broad as extradition
habeas, which in turn suggests that this aspect of the Act's appeal provisions is con-
stitutional. With respect to CSRT review, the analogy of extradition habeas is less
clear, because the process being reviewed is more extensive in extradition, with the
result that one could argue that an equal or possibly narrower scope of review in ex-
tradition habeas is more palatable. Put differently, one could use the extradition anal-
ogy either way in the context of CSRT review. 367 For the possible third category of
people seeking to challenge their rendition or transfer to another country, the extra-
dition analogy could support some kind of federal court review despite the statutory
bar. The analogy holds best, however, for situations that are functionally similar to ex-
tradition, where the person is "in" the United States, which in turn simply forces the
question of how to characterize places that are under U.S. jurisdiction, but outside its
formal boundaries.
Once again, two caveats are in order, this time with respect to any use of extradi-
tion as an analogy. First, a person facing extradition is not in exactly the same position
as a person seeking review of a CSRT or military commission decision-but neither are
their situations entirely inapposite. The consequences of an extradition are serious. A
person, perhaps a citizen, will be seized, removed from this country, and sent overseas,
based solely on a finding of probable cause, to face a criminal process that may be
far less rights-protective than our own and that could result in prolonged imprison-
ment. Second, extradition habeas doctrine also predates the mid- and late-twentieth
century revolution in habeas review. Thus, rather than accepting it as authority for the
365 Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925) (emphasis omitted).
3' Note that the language of the second review provision enacted by the MCA, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, § 9, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636-37 (2006), which is slightly different from the one
created by the DTA (and amended by the MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(3), 119 Stat.
2680, 2743 (2006), suggests that he was correct or at least that Congress set out to make him
correct after the fact.
367 The usefulness of the extradition analogy to the government in both circumstances is
enhanced if one also notes that, like the military commission or CSRT decision, extradition
touches on international relations, with the result that courts have been extremely deferential
to the executive branch, despite the individual liberty issues involved. The Second Circuit
went so far as to assert that, if there were no extradition statute, "the Executive Branch would
retain plenary authority to extradite." Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1103 n.2 (2d Cir.
1996). Also worth noting, however, is that although such words warm the hearts of executive
power proponents, they are flatly wrong from the perspectives of history and precedent. See
Parry, Lost History, supra note 59, at 105-24.
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constitutionality of Detainee Treatment Act review, one could respond that extradition
habeas is itself inadequate and requires reform.36
My goal in analogizing to extradition is not entirely doctrinal, however. The law
of extradition has always dealt with an exceptional situation, in which a sovereign
determines whether and how to seize a person lawfully in its territory and transport
that person to the territory of another sovereign for the purpose of criminal prose-
cution. To address this exceptional circumstance, U.S. law provides less process than
in ordinary criminal cases. Note, too, the role of habeas. Habeas corpus--often por-
trayed as the bulwark against arbitrary state action-also becomes in this context a way
of legitimizing departures from normal processes and affirming the government's
power.369 Put more concretely, habeas functions in extradition as a backstop that im-
poses minimal due process protections, while most of the real process takes place in
other forums--either the Article I courtroom or the office of the Secretary of State.
The same arrangement holds for CSRT and military commissions under the Detainee
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act. In all of these cases, limited review
arguably validates the exceptional process.
Going further, in the exceptional circumstance of using state power to expel a
person from the country-a situation akin to exile-the law of extradition strips the
person of normal rights. The result is that sovereign authority operates more freely
on that person's body and circumstances. Seen in this way, the extraditee is an example
of what Agamben calls the homo sacer, the person reduced to "bare life" before the
power of the state.37° Using the extradition analogy from this angle, we see again that
the person held in indefinite military detention, the "ghost detainee" held by the CIA,
3" For citations to cases that favor expanded extradition habeas review and an argument
in favor of reform, see Parry, Lost History, supra note 59, at 155-58 & n.326. A further
distinction might be that extradition has often been described as a sui generis proceeding, see
United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491,498 (2d Cir. 1986) (Friendly, J.), and therefore cannot
be analogized to anything else (but query whether CSRT and military commission decisions
are not also sui generis). One might also argue that extradition questions sound in due process
and not under the suspension clause, but the adequate substitute inquiry under the suspension
clause is not easily distinguished from a due process inquiry.
369 As Agamben puts it,
If it is true that law needs a body in order to be in force, and if one can
speak, in this sense, of "law's desire to have a body," democracy responds
to this desire by compelling law to assume the care of this body....
Corpus is a two-faced being, the bearer both of subjection to sovereign
power and of individual liberties.
AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER, supra note 7, at 124-25 (emphasis omitted). For criticism of
Agamben's analysis of habeas corpus, see Peter Fitzpatrick, Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer
and the Insistence of Law, in PoLmcs, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH, supra note 10, at 49. For
a more subtle use of habeas corpus as a marker for both liberal rights and submission to state
authority, see Roberto Buonamano, Humanity and Inhumanity: State Power and the Force
of Law in the Prescription of Juridical Norms, in EVIL, LAW AND THE STATE: PERSPECTIVES
ON STATE POWER AND VIOLENCE 159, 164-65 (John T. Parry ed., 2006).
370 See AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 7, at 6-11, 182-83. In describing the idea
of bare life, Agamben uses the example of exile. See id. at 109-11.
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the person facing trial before a military commission, and the person subjected to ex-
traordinary rendition are also held in space that is exceptional as a matter of law.
They, too, are reduced to bare life.
The analogy has one more step. The law of extradition is not reserved for aliens.
The same process and the same limited rights also apply to citizens who face extra-
dition to other countries, 71 with the result that they too may be reduced to bare life.
3 72
The exceptional space created by extradition law thus expands beyond aliens, the group
of people that one might think are doomed to reside in a such a condition (indeed,
their status typically helps define the contrasting status of the citizen who is thought
not to be in that condition). Similarly, at least some of the new and exceptional pro-
cesses associated with the war on terror are applied to citizens as well as aliens. The
risk with the creation of exceptions is always that they will expand beyond their origi-
nal, limited scope. And here the import of the new criminal process-the process that
includes constitutional criminal procedure as well as the law of the war on terror-
kicks in, because the doctrines that make up the new criminal process reveal that the
exception is already becoming the rule across the bodies of citizens and aliens, resi-
dents and non-residents alike.
IV. THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS, EMERGENCY POWER, AND THE
STATE OF EXCEPTION
At the beginning of this essay, I argued that the President and Congress have
created a legal structure for a state of emergency. Since 9/11, constitutional law schol-
ars have renewed the debate over the existence and constitutionality of emergency
powers. 73 Unlike the constitutions of many other countries, the U.S. Constitution
3" See 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (2000); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S.
5, 8-9, 18 (1936) (holding executive branch may extradite a citizen if authorized to do so by
statute or treaty). The process created by the international extradition statute makes no dis-
tinction between citizens and aliens. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); see also Parry, Lost History,
supra note 59, at 123-24 (discussing treatment of aliens in extradition law and practice).
372 AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER, supra note 7, at 128 ("Rights are attributed to man (or origi-
nate in him) solely to the extent that man is the immediately vanishing ground (who must never
come to light as such) of the citizen."); id. at 188 ("[W]e are not only... animals whose life
as living beings is at issue in their politics, but also-inversely--citizens whose very politics
is at issue in their natural body.").
371 Contemporary academic discussion of emergency power and U.S. constitutional law
begins at least with Jules Lobel's prescient and insightful article, Emergency Power and the
Decline of Liberalism, supra note 101. See also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of
the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1993). One might also go back to CLINTON RossnrER's
CONSTrrUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).
For important recent essays, see David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency
Inside or Outside the Legal Order, 27 CARDOzO L. REv. 2005 (2006); John Ferejohn &
Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT'LJ. CON.
L. 210 (2004), available at http://icon.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/reprint/2/2/210; Levinson,
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has little to say on this issue apart from making the President the commander in chief,
preventing quartering of soldiers in people's homes, and allowing Congress to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus in limited circumstances.374 To some scholars, the text
supports a claim that there are no other emergency powers-anything the govern-
ment does must accord with the Constitution in normal or emergency times.375 Others
suggest the Constitution must include some inherent authority to act in cases of emer-
gency (and this power is usually claimed for the executive branch).376 A third position
maintains that there is no inherent constitutional emergency power, but the President
may violate the Constitution in an emergency and then face whatever consequences
Congress and the people wish to impose.37 Institutional and political controls, in short,
might be able to limit and contain emergency power even if law cannot.378
In my view, the third position is most satisfying as a matter of doctrine, not simply
because it best accords with liberal ideas about limited government and the rule of
law, but also because it adopts a pragmatic position without the vice of giving an un-
restricted license to the executive branch. That said, this model is not the dominant
supra note 205; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1257 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and
the Temptations of 9/11,6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004). See also Gross, Chaos and Rules,
supra note 101, which updates and extends Lobel's analysis.
374 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2; id. art. II, § 2, cl.1; id. amend. III. For discussion of
emergency provisions in other constitutions, see Gabriel L. Negretto & Jos6 Antonio Aguilar
Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt
and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 1797 (2000); Scheppele,
supra note 373.
311 See Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1801 (2004).
376 For varying versions of this view, see JOHN Yoo, THE PowERs OF WAR AND PEACE:
THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFrER 9/11 (2005); Ackerman, supra note 12;
Paulsen, supra note 373. These views gain support from statements like this:
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of
the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security
of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of
the national government may be put forth to brush away all obstructions
to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails.
If the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are
at the service of the Nation to compel obedience to its laws.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895). The suggestion in Debs that the executive branch has
inherent power to use violence to impose order has been qualified by more recent doctrinal
developments, most notably Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), both of which stress the role of Congress.
But the specific holding of Debs, that the executive has inherent authority to seek injunctive
relief, 158 U.S. 564, has never been overruled. For additional discussion of Debs, compare
Monaghan, supra note 373, with Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra note 198, at 131-34.
377 See Gross, Chaos and Rules, supra note 101; Lobel, supra note 101, at 1386-88.
378 See sources cited supra note 377.
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approach as a matter of theory or doctrine. The Supreme Court's and Congress's re-
sponses to detention, interrogation, and military commissions demonstrate instead that
we are more likely to see an uneven oscillation between the first two positions, so that
courts and legislatures sometimes will reject claims of emergency power and at other
times will accept them, perhaps with caveats. The result is a "two steps forward, one
step back" process of increasing state and particularly executive power. Because of
their roots in emergency situations, moreover, these increased powers tend to take
a special form in which more familiar legal processes are pushed aside in favor of
efficient discretionary authority.
Consider the following examples. In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt declared a banking
emergency that lasted into the 1970s. In 1950, President Truman declared a national
emergency that also lasted until the early 1970s. By the time those "emergencies" fi-
nally ended, the U.S. statute books contained roughly 470 pieces of legislation that pro-
vided the executive with some form of emergency power in particular circumstances.3
79
Myriad other statutes have nothing ostensibly to do with emergency power, but they
follow what has become the "normal" model of providing relatively unconstrained dele-
gations of lawmaking power or its equivalent from the legislature to the executive.38°
Consider, too, the amount of time the U.S. has been at war in recent years. After
World War HI, the U.S. entered almost immediately into a Cold War with the Soviet
Union that lasted until 1989, with numerous sub-wars and proxy wars in Korea,
Vietnam, Africa, the Middle East, and Central America. The Gulf War against Iraq
followed almost as soon as the Cold War ended, and after that swift victory, the U.S.
remained on a military footing with respect to the Middle East that culminated in the
second war against Iraq, as well as the war against Afghanistan (which can also be seen
as part of an arguably separate war on terror). Military occupation of Afghanistan
and Iraq continues, not to mention the persistence for twenty-five years of a cold war
with Iran that appears to be spawning its own proxy wars. The idea of war has also
played out in domestic policy. At least since the 1970s we have been embroiled in a
war on crime that spawned an ongoing war on drugs and that overlaps with the war
on terror, which itself has been underway for more than twenty years.38 ' Even more,
criminal issues have gone global, so that certain kinds of crime become seen not merely
as domestic issues but also as transnational or international, and in the process become
... See Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 49, at 4-5; Lobel, supra note 101, at 1404,
1408.
380 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
381 For good discussions of the impact that the war on drugs and the war on terror have
on rights, along the lines of my discussion in Part I1, see Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty
of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1389 (1993); William J.
Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002). For the duration of the
war on terror, see Robert M. Chesney, Careful Thinking About Counterterrorism Policy, 1
J. NAT. SEC. L & POL'Y 169, 171-77 (2005) (reviewing PHIIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM,
FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR (2003)).
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identified as national security issues. The result is a deepened sense of emergency,
increased cooperation between national police forces, and "significant militarization
of policing at home and abroad. 382
The war metaphor has spilled over into other policy issues as well. Indeed, the
idea of "war" as a way of addressing social ills has been normalized for quite some
time. And, as Hardt and Negri observe, "these discourses of war serve to mobilize all
social forces and suspend or limit normal political exchange .... In these wars there
is increasingly little difference between outside and inside, between foreign conflicts
and homeland security. "383 With less critical distance, then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld made the same point when he instructed us that "if we're punctu-
ated periodically with additional terrorist attacks," we will remember "that we do have
an obligation to ourselves and our system and our friends and allies around the world
to behave responsibly" in the sense of maintaining a vigilant stance against terrorism
akin to our position during the Cold War.38
Rumsfeld's words also support Hardt and Negri's contention that "[o]ne conse-
quence of this new kind of war is that the limits of war are rendered indeterminate,
both spatially and temporally." '385 That is to say, as I highlighted at the beginning
of this Article.
[W]ar against a concept or set of practices, somewhat like a war of
religion, has no definite spatial or temporal boundaries. Such wars
can potentially extend anywhere for any period of time. Indeed,
when U.S. leaders announced the "war against terrorism" they
emphasized that it would have to extend throughout the world and
continue for an indefinite period, perhaps decades or even genera-
tions. A war to create and maintain social order can have no end.
It must involve the continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and
violence. In other words, one cannot win such a war, or, rather, it
has to be won again every day.
386
The result is that war not only becomes "virtually indistinguishable from police ac-
tivity, '387 but also "tends to become a form of rule" in all senses of that term.388 While
382 Mark Laffey & Jutta Weldes, Representing the International: Sovereignty After Moder-
nity?, in EMPIRE'S NEW CLOTHES, supra note 8, at 121, 137.
383 HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 3, at 14.
"' Donald H. Rumsfeld, "The American People Have Got the Staying Power for This,"
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at A10.
385 HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 3, at 14.
386 id.
387 Id.; see also HARDT & NEGRI, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 189 ("[T]he separation of tasks
between the external and the internal arms of power (between the army and the police, the
CIA and the FBI) is increasingly vague and indeterminate.").
388 HARDT &NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 3, at 341; see also HARDT &NEGRI, EMPIRE,
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Hardt and Negri intend this analysis primarily to describe a global use of military force
that takes the form of policing, my suggestion is that it applies nearly as well to do-
mestic or internal politics and state power.
From all of this, one might conclude that "[mlodernity itself is defined by crisis."389
Whether one goes so far, the examples and analysis above bear out Agamben's claim
that in modem states "the state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the domi-
nant paradigm of government. ''390 In a state of exception, normal rules are suspended,
and sovereign authority wields discretionary power. When the suspension of normal
rules becomes the new norm, then no space remains for anything but the decision; ordi-
nary legal rules are pushed aside. If, therefore, as Carl Schmitt claimed, "the state re-
mains, whereas law recedes" in a time of exception,39' then as Mark Tushnet suggests,
a permanent condition of emergency threatens "the end of the rule of law itself.,
392
Yet the consequences of the modern state of exception are not so immediately dra-
matic. The "official" declaration of a war on drugs led not to lawless state action but
to legislation: the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
393
The same is true with the war on terror. The first part of this Article discusses some
of the legislation enacted in response to the perceived threat of terror and refers to
that process as the "structuring" of an emergency. In our current political climate, it
may even be that the supposedly exceptional and temporary condition is a useful (dare
one say necessary?) precondition for the expansion of normal regulation. If that is
true, then the common linkage between the state of emergency and the discretionary
decision is more complicated than it first appears. Private law and private and civil
rights may recede in a state of emergency, but public, regulatory, and administratively-
defined law-law that is characterized by discretion-remains and expands.
supra note 6, at 38 (suggesting uses of military force "take the form of police actions because
they are aimed at maintaining an internal order. In this way intervention is an effective mech-
anism that through police deployments contributes directly to the construction of the moral,
normative, and institutional order of Empire").
389 HARDT & NEGRI, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 76 (emphasis omitted).
39o AGAMBEN, STATE OFEXCEPTION, supra note 7, at 2. Not surprisingly, Hardt and Negri
agree: "[T]he state of exception has become permanent and general; the exception has become
the rule, pervading both foreign relations and the homeland." HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE,
supra note 3, at 7 (emphasis omitted).
'9' CARL SCHMITT, POLITCAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOV-
EREIGNTY 12 (George Schwab trans., The MIT Press 1985) (1922) [hereinafter ScHMrrr,
POLITICAL THEOLOGY].
392 Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTrrUTION
IN WARTIME, supra note 12, at 45; see also BUTLER, supra note 20, at 50-100; Oren Gross,
The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers
and the "Norm-Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOzO L. REv. 1825, 1854, 1857 (2000); Lobel,
supra note 101, at 1404.
313 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10-12 (2005).
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Perhaps this is how exceptions and emergencies work in modem, liberal democ-
racies. One does not simply see a general clamor for the firm hand of a leader who
will guide and represent us better than a corrupt or indecisive legislature.394 Yet the
failure to act is almost unthinkable. As issues arise one by one in a variety of areas,
rational and well-intentioned policymakers inevitably conclude that increased govern-
ment regulation is necessary, which in turn often takes the form of executive dis-
cretion girded by procedural frameworks.395 As we have seen with the development
of the new criminal process, courts tend to go along with these changes. In short, as
Schmitt recognized, "the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the
juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind. '39 Order, moreover,
is not just the application of discretion "justified by the appeal to essential values of
justice. 397 Rather, as Agamben suggests, "instead of declaring the state of exception,"
contemporary democracies "prefer[] to have exceptional laws issued.' 398 The increas-
ing room within our constitutional order for states of exception is thus simultaneously
lawless and filled with law.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described the ways in which the war on terror has generated ex-
traordinary criminal processes applicable to people suspected of terrorism. Further,
I have suggested that these new processes are not contained within the war on terror.
Instead, they reflect trends in ordinary criminal procedure. That is to say, the pres-
sures that generate the processes associated with the war on terror apply more broadly,
" For the claim that a leader who governs through acclamation may be as democratically
legitimate as one elected by ballot-an idea that is not completely foreign to some executive
power claims-see CARL SCHMr1T, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 16-17 (Ellen
Kennedy trans., 2d ed., The MIT Press 1985) (1926). For an idea of democratic participation
"that is linked to the vitality of a population and to its capacity to generate a dialectic of
counterpowers-a concept, therefore, that has little to do with the classical or the modern
concept of democracy," see HARDT & NEGRI, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 373. Explaining exactly
how this second concept-which insists on "the absence of every external limit from the
trajectories of the action of the multitude," id.--differs from the first is one of the problems
that Hardt and Negri never quite overcome.
3" Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), is the most
significant such framework.
396 SCHMITr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 391, at 12; see Paul A. Passavant, From
Empire's Law to the Multitude's Rights: Law, Representation, Revolution, in EMPIRE'S NEW
CLOTHES, supra note 8, at 95, 104-06.
197 HARDT & NEGRI, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 18 (emphasis omitted).
398 AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 7, at 21; see also Ferejohn & Pasquino,
supra note 373, at 216 ("A new model of emergency powers-the legislative model-has
evolved over the past half century.. . ."); Kanwar, supra note 189, at 573 (elaborating on
this aspect of Agamben's argument and linking it to contemporary constitutional theories of
emergency power). Arendt's distinction between positive and totalitarian law once again comes
to mind. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
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so that we are experiencing a general modification of the way in which our govern-
ment investigates and imposes punishment on people. Going further, I have argued
that these processes--the new criminal process-reflect a larger shift in our approach
to governing, in which legally authorized discretion is increasingly valued as a way
to respond to a steady stream of perceived crises.
The perils of this shift are large, but not always easily seen. As discretionary
state power is mobilized, it may succeed in punishing and preventing harm and deliv-
ering security, comfort, and other benefits to specific populations. In addition, courts
may shore up rights in one place or another to mitigate the impact of the new crim-
inal process. But the link between the new criminal process and the legal and concep-
tual problems associated with the normalization of emergencies means that state power
over all of us--over our bodies, our mobility, our words and actions, and of course
our lives--continues to increase, particularly when our conduct intersects with the
criminal law.
Yet in the near term, the extent of the Bush's administration's executive power
claims and its insistence on a war paradigm for fighting terrorism have backfired to
some degree. A large and sustained reaction could be forming, building to some ex-
tent on the Supreme Court's detention decisions, concern among many members of
Congress and some military circles about coercion and military trials, and public un-
ease with unconventional tactics. The shift in control of Congress after the 2006 elec-
tions and the looming election of a new President in 2008 underscore the possibilities
of pushing back against the war model. Certainly many aspects of the new criminal
process that relate to the war on terror are vulnerable, although the prospect of revers-
ing the more widespread and entrenched aspects of the new criminal process is remote
at best. Perhaps the most optimistic conclusion is to say, with Hardt and Negri, that
it remains an open question whether these developments "will allow us to build sites
of liberation or rather submit us to new forms of subjugation and exploitation. '
399 HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 3, at 285.
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